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Abstract 
The competitiveness and ferocity in the global markets have pushed companies to new 
investments in innovation strategies, attempting a sustainable guarantee and distinguished 
advantages over their competitors. Within this path new technological opportunities, which do 
not belong to the core business of the company, will eventually be created. These technological 
opportunities cause difficulties and challenges on how to generate value from them. 
The literature has highlighted the importance of the technological spin-offs as a particular type 
of instrument that can be used by companies in order to take advantage of the discovered 
technological opportunity, conceding in this way economical and social benefits. Despite the 
quality and quantity of research in this area, these are essentially theoretical/conceptual nature, 
being rare empirical studies, especially from companies located in countries of intermediate 
development as is the case of Portugal, where the themes of innovation, entrepreneurship of 
science base and technology have in recent years been central in discourses (but maybe not so 
much in the actions) of political authorities and companies. 
The objective of this dissertation proposal is to study the process of emergence of Technological 
spin-offs. In this way our goal is to analyze the Spin-Off as a corporate/management 
performance instrument, while assessing their economic and financial impact at the level of the 
host company. As a basis for the study were selected 4 companies listed in the Portuguese PSI  - 
Martifer; EDP-Energias de Portugal, Galp-Energia, SGPS, Sonae - involving different 
scales/dimensions, different geographical locations and lines of business. This selection is 
characterized by having in the recent years by the adoption of different trajectories and strategic 
options. 
Drawing primarily on data contained in the Annual Reports of the selected companies, we 
performed a content analysis of the strategies adopted and a preliminary quantitative analysis of 
the respective economic and financial performances. This detailed analysis allowed withdraw 
the following main conclusions: 1) (technological) spin offs are indeed an instrument of 
corporate management; 2) technological spin offs per se do not determine high host company 
performance; 3)  technological spin offs do impact on host company performance when 
sustained in human capital drivers; 4) business experience and sector of activity matter for the 
impact of spin offs on host company performance; 5) the existence of complementarities among 
host company business segments and the investment driver stand as critical explanatory factors 
for the impact of spin offs on host company performance. 
Keywords: Technology, Spin-offs, Economical performance.  
JEL-Codes: O32; M13; L25 
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Introduction 
Market competiveness has a critical dimension for almost all type of businesses (Zott 
and Amit, 2008). Globalization has brought an all new set of challenges to companies 
(Kalish et al., 1995). Shareholders increasingly demand for larger revenues. Given the 
emergence and development of BRICs’(Brazil, Russia, India and China) companies, 
which now compete in the same markets, with cheaper offers (although they are not as 
technologically advanced yet), western companies face new and fiercer competitiveness 
challenges (Bird, 2006). Along with these threats large companies face the rise of 
smaller companies which present alternative proposals through different business 
models and through innovation, challenging the incumbents (Zahra, 1996; Agarwall et 
al., 2004; Rohrbeck et al., 2009). 
This dynamic and competitive environment fostered western companies to seek and to 
gain extra advantages through investments in R&D (Zahra, 1996). This path led to new 
technological breakthroughs, which often do not belong to the core business of the 
company (Chesbrough, 2003; Agarwall et al., 2004). As consequence, the new 
technologies that cannot be used tend to be spilled out into an external environment or 
even lost, if the company does not find a way to profit from them (Zahra, 1996; 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Chesbrough, 2003; Agarwall et al., 2004; Klepper 
and Sleeper, 2005; Narayanan et al., 2009).  
In face of a technological discovery, corporations management have at their disposal 
some alternatives/ instruments in order to transform the new technology into economic 
value (Zahra, 1996; Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Chesbrough, 2003;Clarysse et 
al., 2005; Rohrbeck et al., 2009): 1) do nothing and hope that the new technology could 
be used later on; 2) incorporate the discovery into the current core business; 3) try to 
create, within the firm, a new business ‘line’ and therefore increase the company´s 
product/service diversity; 4) seek to sale or license the technology to other firms, 
guaranteeing some returns; and 5) use corporate venturing mechanism through a 
company’s spin-off that will develop and commercialize the discovery. 
The importance of the spin-off process and the benefits that are generated to society 
such as employment, technology improvement and economic growth are unquestionable 
(Zahra, 1996; Chesbrough, 2003, Agarwall et al., 2004; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; 
Zahra et al., 2007; Narayanan et al., 2009). According to Zahra et al. (2007: 569), 
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“corporate spin-offs (CSOs) represent around 12.9% of new firm formation in Europe, 
producing an above average net employment growth of at least 8%”. This trend is 
aligned with the researchers’ belief that spin-offs contribute significantly to the 
development of a company’s corporate strategy, through the creation of new value 
offerings or new capabilities in the form of knowledge, by fostering strategic changes 
and by increasing the corporation growth in all markets where the corporation is doing 
business (Narayanan et al., 2009).  
The importance of innovation and technological discovery, as well as the benefits that 
are generated to the economy and society, have been object of interest and deeply 
researched by the scientific community in the last few years. This research has been 
mainly centred in the knowledge transferred between public institutions (e.g. 
Universities, incubators, or science parks) and private in the form of start-ups  or by 
selling or licensing the universities intellectual property rights to companies 
(Rothaermel et al., 2007; Cleyn and Braetn, 2010). Rothaermel (2007) argues that this 
academic movement and the rise of venture capital, taking advantage of science 
knowledge, have been largely encouraged by the Bayh-Dole Act.
1
 
The increased importance of knowledge transfer has also emphasized the outlook of 
spin-off phenomenon as an important management instrument (Parhankangas and 
Arenius, 2003). Consequently, this led to an intensification of the research on financial 
externalities, specifically the performance impact generated by the venture mechanism 
(i.e., the spin-off).  
The literature has highlighted the importance of a particular spin-off - technological 
spin-off -, with more knowledge and skill based. And in this way, it has a higher 
capacity to generate an economical impact along with social benefits. According to 
Chesbrough (2003: 404) “[a] technology spin-off company is a particular type of spin-
off company … that is created for the purpose of commercializing one or more research 
discoveries outside the main business of the ﬁrm”. Such discoveries give companies the 
opportunity to expand their business into different areas. In some cases, through the 
creation of new products increasing the economic performance of the corporation and, 
                                                 
1
 The Bayh–Dole Act (P.L. 96-517, Patent and Trademark Act Amendments of 1980) is United States 
legislation created to deal with the inventions made under federally-funded research programs, given 
small business and non-profits organizations like universities intellectual property control over their 
inventions and other intellectual property that resulted from such funding. This legislation was created 
specially as instrument of technology transfer between universities and private 
(http://www.autm.net/Bayh_Dole_Act.htm, accessed 7 January of 2012). 
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therefore, bringing more value to the stakeholders (John and Ofek, 1995; Zhara et al., 
1995; Zahra, 1996; Martin and Sayrak, 2003).  
From the discussion on spin-offs, two types of theoretical approaches are identified: 
one, more managerial focused, and the other more economic based. For instance, 
authors in line with Chesbrough (2003, 2002), Rohrbeck et al. (2009), or Zahra and 
George (2002), following a managerial line, analyse the linkage between the spin-off 
and the value creation from different perspectives, like: 1) the technology potential and 
appropriability, 2) the market forecast influence, 3) the localization conditions that 
foster the technology irruption, 4) the human capital and the organization identity 
existent in the company that influences the overall behavior, 5) the knowledge transfer 
and the intellectual proprietary rights management, and 6) the business strategy behind 
the spin-off. They argue that the success of a spin-off can be deeply influenced by 
several conditions, but, despite that, the opportunity and value generation that could 
emergence is very high. Authors like Cusatis et al. (1993), John and Ofek (1995), 
Martin and Sayrak (2003), Rovetta (2006), or Harris and Glegg (2008), more in line 
with an economic line, assess the performance impact of the spin-off creations in the 
companies’ stock market. The authors argue that a positive influence will appear due to 
several factors, like: 1) the decrease of the asymmetric information between market and 
organization, 2) the reorganization of the corporation, 3) the refocus strategy that 
typically are behind the spin-off, and 4) increase of efficiency on the corporation value 
chain. 
However, the existing scientific research is still vague and blurred about both of the 
motivations that could lead to the creation of a corporate spin-off and its corresponding 
success conditions (Lindholm Dahlstrand, 1997; Davenport et al., 2002; Sapienza et al., 
2004; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005). 
The goal of the present dissertation is to study the process of emergence of 
technological spin-offs. Analyzing them as corporate/management performance 
instruments and to assess their economic and financial impact at the level of the host 
company, contributing in this way to add fresh and additional evidence on the theme. 
This dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 1 we revise existent literature on 
theories and determinants of a spin-off, deepening the analysis of existent articles about 
the process decision and the performance that is expected to happen. In Chapter 2 we 
detail the methodological considerations of the study. The in-depth analysis of the case 
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studies selected is presented in Chapter 3. Finally, in Conclusions, we summarize the 
main outcomes of the research and put forward the limitations of the present research 
and the main avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 1. A critical review of the literature on technology spin-off as 
performance instruments  
1.1. Initial considerations  
This section performs a critical review of the existent literature on the spin-off’s topic, 
with special incidence on the impact of technological discovery in the process and the 
opportunity that could come to incumbent companies.  
The present dissertation analyses the economic and financial benefits of a spin-off to the 
parent company, presenting the factors that can influence the decision and the 
performance behavior of this instrument. For this reason, the literature review 
undertaken, covers the different point-of-views existent among the scientific community 
(economic and managerial), and that fosters the understanding of the spin-off 
phenomenon.  
In this way this section details the process of a corporate spin-off creation, organizing 
the literature according to a simplified model that explains the creation. The simplified 
model, based on several existent models, considers that a spin-off emergence depends 
on the following three major vectors; 1) firms, 2) decision process, and 3) performance.  
Before detailing each vector of the process of spin off creation, the next section (Section 
1.2) presents a brief and preliminary bibliometric analysis that helped to sort out the 
relevant literature underlying the analytical model proposed (Section 1.3). 
1.2. Corporate spin offs: a preliminary bibliometric analysis  
The literature on technology transfer and commercialization has observed a huge 
development in the last decade (Rothaermel et al., 2007) being quite wide span and 
diverse (Cleyn and Braetn, 2010).  
In order to obtain an integrated overview of the literature we performed a brief 
bibliometric exercise by searching in the bibliographic database Scopus® with the 
keywords ‘Spin-Offs’ and ‘Performance’, which returned 168 results.  
The organization of the existing literature involved a classification based on the type of 
research (theoretical versus empirical), the unit of analysis (micro, meso, macro), 
country(ies), the methodology applied - in the case of empirical research, if it involved a 
quantitative or qualitative method -, and the topic or field of study. 
 6 
In Figure 1, it is depicted the literature evolution over the time from 1981 until 2010 in 
sets of five-year periods. Despite the topic having already some years in the literature, it 
has been subject of increase interest and research in the last decade. This evidence is in 
line with the arguments of authors like Davenport et al. (2002), Rothaermel et al. 
(2007), or Narayanan et al. (2009). In empirical papers the proportion of quantitative 
methodologies used is always higher than the qualitative. This fact can be explained by 
pursuit to prove the advantages that the spin-off can bring to the economy. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of the literature on 1981-2010 and the distribution of empirical research 
methodology 
Source: Author’s computations based on papers gathered from Scopus® 
 
The existing literature describes different models that aim at explaining the process of 
spin-offs creation. The model by Ndonzuau et al. (2002) provides a general framework; 
being composed by four successive stages, which according with the authors are “not 
wholly independent of each other”. The model is characterized by the following stages; 
1) generation; 2) finalization; 3) spin-off launch; and 4) spin-off strengthen.  
The first phase, the generation of ideas, results typically from the knowledge, in its 
different forms (codified of tacit). The second phase of the model, the selection 
mechanism, is where the ideas are selected by the opportunity and value recognition. 
The belief that an idea will generate value is what fosters a spin-off creation. The third 
step in the model is where the idea takes form and projects itself into a company. And 
finally, in the last step, the model predicts the strength of the company that depending 
on the model is the outcome of the product’s commercialization (Cleyn and Braet, 
2010). 
A more complex model is the one by Hindle et al. (2004), following a linear form of 
previous models taking into consideration the peripheral aspects, like the individual 
knowledge and entrepreneurship, research support, technological opportunity, and the 
investment made by venture capital (Cleyn and Braet, 2010). However, the model 
proposed by Hindle et al. (2004, in Cleyn and Braet, 2010), does not consider the 
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process of developing or addressing the market. Further, the model does not include 
feedback loops in the spin-off creation. 
More recently, Cleyn and Braet (2006) proposed an integrated model. To begin with, 
the starting and end point are dynamic, this means that they can happen either in a more 
advanced stage or earlier in the process. Furthermore, the stages are considered 
independent unlike the previous model (Ndonzuau et al. (2002; Hindle et al., 2004). 
According to the model, an idea that has originated a company only ends when its entity 
disappears. Also, the model predicts that different paths could occur in the process 
through buy-outs like mergers or buy-ins like acquisitions, changing the original 
company. The model concedes the markets role and the impact of the business plan in 
the spin-off process. Ultimately, the model foresees the interactions between the 
different phases, and also between the different identities involved in the process, 
combining the all kinds of information and capabilities, providing a more realist 
approach of the reality. 
Based on the above proposals, we devised a simpler model that seeks to explain the 
spin-off’s emergence process, by highlighting three distinct, although interrelated, 
phases (Figure 2): 1) the firm and all that surrounds and influences it (‘Firms’); 2) the 
decision process with all its variable inputs that can lead to a Spin-Off (‘Decision 
process’); and 3) the outcome results of a spin-off firm (‘Performance’). 
 
Figure 2: The process of Spin-Off creation 
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Figure 3 presents the distribution of the literature according the model proposed. The 
spin-off decision process has been the most analyzed subject of research. However, in 
the more recent periods the assessment of the performance impact has gain prominence.  
 
Figure 3: The distribution of the literature on 1981-2012 according the model proposed 
Source: Author’s computations based on papers gathered from Scopus® 
 
1.3. Detailing the phases of the process of corporate spin off creation 
1.3.1. ‘Firms’ 
There are several factors related with the capacity of an organization to generate value 
through the process of a spin-off creation. The consensus that company’s 
entrepreneurial characteristics are one of the key elements to develop and create value 
inside an organization is undeniable (Antoncic and Hisrich, 2001). The strategies behind 
entrepreneurship are of high importance, as they increase the perspective of value-
creation and value appropriation (Agarwall et al., 2004). 
The importance of the characteristics that differentiate companies, such as risk-taking 
orientation, are critical. These allow attempts for quests that search for bold visions 
(Zahra, 1996). Entrepreneurship, as well as the capacity to develop and create values, is 
deeply connected with knowledge and an existent competence within the organization. 
However, this depends not only on the employees’ education but also on the path 
conducted by the company’s exposure to unique experiences, such as geographical 
environment, the interaction among customers and suppliers, alliances with other forms 
or even market competitors (Zahra and George, 2002). 
Companies use their human capital to develop and create value offers, where 
simultaneously, employees earn more technological know-how, new social links, and 
cultural enrichment from the employers (Zahra, 1996; Zahra and George, 2002). Zahra 
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and George (2002) suggest that the tacit knowledge existent inside an organization is 
also inherently present in individual employees. Further, according to the same authors, 
“employees of firms with greater knowledge capabilities are more likely to perceive the 
next generation of technologies and markets earlier than their counterparts in firms that 
lag behind.” (Agarwall et al., 2004: 6).  
In fact, employees with higher skills benefit companies through: 1) the capacity to 
create value, 2) the improvement of their adapting and learning skills, and 3) the 
identification of new opportunities (Agarwall et al., 2004), giving them the capacity  to 
increase the business performance or diversifying the product’s portfolio. Agarwall et 
al. (2004) argue that these skills are especially important in high technology markets, 
where technology volatility is very high and frequent and in some cases disruptive, 
creating opportunities and big threats.  
This know-how and knowledge crucially came with the assumption that technology 
innovation is what drives companies to success (Zahra, 1996). The literature agrees on 
this associating company’s performance to its technological competence and 
innovation. The technological competence is what allows a company to generate new 
discoveries and breakthroughs, enabling the company to commercialize the innovation 
in the foreheads of competitors, gaining an important advantage (Zahra, 1996; 
Chesbrough, 2003; Agarwall et al.; 2004; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Narayanan et al., 
2009). 
The corporation management should be able to monitor and use all sources of 
technology, whether they are internal or external. These could improve the company 
performance, through the incorporation of these advances and innovations in the 
products or process. However, it is critical to identify correctly the conditions needed to 
take advantage from them, which in some cases can be very hard. These conditions can 
go from the employees’ education, hiring and, in some cases, even acquiring a company 
to obtain the right skills (Zahra, 1996). 
The use of external sources of technology is more than a trend. The existence of the 
denominated technology market, where companies can profit from their in-house R&D 
through new types of business models like licensing or selling the intellectual 
proprietary existent in the technology, cannot be neglected by top management (Zahra, 
1996; Arora et al., 2001; Agarwall et al., 2004). This is so crucial, that companies tend 
to invest in monitoring technological developments trying to identify possible threats 
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and opportunities. Nowadays, technology forecasting is without doubt a critical 
dimension for companies’ technology strategies. This gives the corporation 
management a timeline of information about environmental changes (Zahra, 1996). 
Zahra (1996) referred a survey from Fortune 500,
2
 where technological environment is 
the second most frequent scanned sector. 
The use of external technology can be an important driver of innovation. Agarwall et al. 
(2004) stress the complementary nature of technology and the synergies that can be 
obtained from these external sources. 
According to Nelson (1991: 64), “[t]he overall result is a view that what firms do is 
determined by the conditions they face, and (possibility) by certain unique attributes 
(say a choice location, or a proprietary technology) they process. Firms facing different 
markets will behave differently, but if the market conditions were reversed so would be 
firm behaviors”. Inevitably, this will lead to different strategies, and consequently, 
different cultures, processes, capabilities, unique paths and therefore, creating a unique 
identity. 
Nevertheless, a company’s identity is not a monolithic phenomenon. Multiple identities 
can exist and co-exist comfortably within a company even if they are slightly different. 
Moreover, corporate leadership should recognize incongruence among them in order to 
prevent causing problems between the company and its stakeholders (Balmer and 
Greyser, 2002). 
According to Corley and Gioia (2004) and Corley (2004), an organization’s identity is 
normally defined answering the question ‘Who are we as an organization?’. This 
represents perceptions and beliefs on what distinguishes the organization from other 
companies, and given the fact that an organization is composed by a large group of 
people, its  potential for identity differentiation is very high (Corley, 2004). In addition, 
such identity is built around the relationship between all resources at the company’s 
disposal, namely, among others, assets, technological knowledge, human resources, 
organizational processes and network linkages (Lindholm Dahlstrand, 1997). 
The literature underlines the role of networks as a key resource of a company (Zahra, 
1996), not only by enabling its access to resources and competences, but also by 
                                                 
2
 The Fortune 500 is an annual list compiled and published by Fortune magazine that ranks the top 500 
U.S. closely held and public corporations as ranked by their gross revenue after adjustments made by 
Fortune. (http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/, accessed 25 January of 2012). 
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allowing the sharing of intangible assets, such as the market perception, its visions, its 
problems, that are critical in the innovation process (Lindelöf and Löfsten, 2005). 
Network is a critical element on the uniqueness of an organization’s identity as it is path 
dependent and, therefore, according to Lindelöf and Löfsten (2005: 1028), 
“idiosyncratic and difficult to imitate and is a subject of immobility, inimitability and 
non substitutional”. 
However, as the organizational identity is socially created and a self-referential belief 
shared by organization members, it is bound to be influenced and changed, especially 
from powerful external stakeholders and competitive pressures perceived by the top 
management (Corley, 2004). The process of an identity change is normally very slow 
and incremental that can last over years (Corley and Gioia, 2004). Nevertheless, there 
are some cases where changes in organizational identity are so overwhelming and 
discontinuous that they are difficult to explain (Corley and Gioia, 2004). 
The Spin-Off creation is an occurrence that potentiates organizational identity changes. 
This new organization that seeks its own survival, growth and success, might have its 
own vision, perceptions and beliefs (Nelson 1991; Zahra, 1996; Agarwall et al., 2004; 
Corley, 2004). Although the introduced changes are normally quite rapid, they can be 
associated with uncertainties and unpredictable, and so, in this way, it becomes a 
process filled with ambiguity (Corley and Gioia, 2004). During this process, and given 
that the comprehension of the ambiguity has crucial dimension to the spin-off process, 
organizational leaders should undertake sense giving promoting collective sense 
making, in order to cultivate a renewed clarity about the amended identity (Zahra et al., 
1999; Corley and Gioia, 2004).  
One of most important facts that foster organizational identity changes is innovation 
(Corley and Gioia, 2004). Despite the acknowledgement that the major competitive 
advantages come from radical innovations, the truth is that large incumbent companies 
tend to defend their position with incremental innovations (Rohrbeck et al., 2009), by 
adopting more conservative, risk adverse and reactive strategies (Lindelöf and Löfsten, 
2006). Smaller companies which are more focused and agile, on one hand struggle to 
find a competitive edge over incumbents, and on another hand rely on radical 
innovations to get that extra mile run, favoring differentiation strategies, and thus being 
more risk takers and proactive (Lindelöf and Löfsten, 2006, 2005). 
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The importance of innovation in a crowd and competitive market, defined by 
technological convergence, has pressured large companies to invest in a strong R&D 
division (Rohrbeck et al., 2009). The R&D outcomes are normally transferred to the 
company through the development of the existing products, where the market units 
receive the evolution very positively (Rohrbeck et al., 2009). However, when the results 
are radical innovations, large companies have difficulties in handling them and taking 
advantage of the opportunity. This is related to the fact that organizations do not 
normally have the right skills to handle new discoveries. The lack of skills can be 
caused by the company’s unawareness of the market that endorses this type of 
technology, or by employees’ inaptitude to quickly learn the right skills (Rohrbeck et 
al., 2009).  
We cannot fail to mention that the R&D investment is deeply affected by the 
environment where the company acts. For instance, in highly competitive markets, 
companies tend to invest in process innovation or in incremental technology. This is 
made in an attempt to increase the competitive position and profit returns (Antoncic and 
Hisrich, 2001). Further, in technology markets, where the effects of appropriability are 
very high and innovation output is difficult, one tends to observe increases in the 
demand of R&D. But, on the other hand, lower appropriability decreases the research 
cost by increasing the opportunities of others to use it (Antoncic and Hisrich, 2001).  
These influences and risks, associated with the intellectual propriety rights, have 
increased strategic alliances, such as joint ventures, license deals, spin-offs, corporate 
capital. Also, when taking advantage of the R&D knowledge either by signaling the 
importance of the intangible technology value in the market or by positioning these 
alliances, it gives companies a sustainable and competitive advantage that competitors 
cannot access (Arora et al., 2001). Further, Arora et al. (2001), argue that these 
dynamics give large companies opportunities to profit from in-house technology that is 
not used. Moreover, it also gives small companies, like spin-offs, the opportunity to 
engage in the more focus strategies based on technology development, pursuing the 
commercialization of them more efficiently. 
The use of innovation discovery in large companies tends to be slow, because of the risk 
of employees leaving the firm with the new discovery and exploring it commercially on 
their own (Agarwall et al., 2004). When this happens companies tend to lose all the 
possible value that they could have profited from. Chesbrough (2002) exemplifies this, 
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referring to the Xerox case. After creating PARK – Palo Alto Research Center, in 1970, 
the company’s employees started to leave the company in order to explore 
commercially some of the technologies discovered: “[b]y 1998, thirty-five new 
companies had been created” (Chesbrough, 2002: 810). 
Another risk that radical innovations have is their ‘window of opportunity’. Innovation 
consists on creating solutions for existing problems (Lindelöf and Löfsten, 2006). 
However, for an innovation to be perceived by the market, the market has to be 
prepared to receive it. This should be taken into account by the corporation management 
when acknowledged, as they are one of most precious, but intangible, assets of a 
company. According to Rohrbeck et al. (2009), the past is full of examples where 
successfully commercialized inventions were not made by the inventive company but 
by a competitor that copied the product. 
The potential of technology discoveries is very hard to measure. However, the literature 
points out the need of an association between the discovery and a right business model, 
which could unlock the market gates, reaching the customer’s needs and pushing the 
company to success (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Agarwall et al., 2004). 
1.3.2. ‘Decision Process’ 
According to Lindholm Dahlstrand (1997), there are different reasons to believe that 
corporate spin-offs can create value: 1) it offers a different degree of management, 
lighter and more flexible, suitable for new challenges; and 2) it empowers it to exploit 
new ideas or new technology outside the company´s interests and pressures.  
The spin-off creation is a corporate instrument which large companies may carry out in 
order to pursuit and develop new areas outside their direct range, and where potential 
future interests and economic profits are high (Antoncic and Hisrich, 2001; Chesbrough, 
2002; Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005). However, the 
decision process of spinning a new company is associated with the parent companies’ 
ability in taking initiative and taking risks. It is considered a bold and disruptive 
instrument used to pursuit new opportunities, such as, new business areas, new products 
or services (Antoncic and Hisrich, 2001; Chesbrough, 2002; Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom, 2002). 
The technology spin-off opportunity emerges in the presence of a discovery where the 
prospect of commercial potential is high (Clarysse et al., 2005), but not belonging to the 
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main core business, the company do not know how to take advantage from them, 
converting it in value offers perceived by the market (Zahra, 1996; Chesbrough, 2003; 
Agarwall et al., 2004; Narayanan et al., 2009). 
The value of technology and the appropriability is another important factor that 
corporation management evaluates, normally associated with the technology properties 
of the discovery (Clarysse et al., 2011). According to Clarysse et al. (2011: 1420), the 
technology properties can be characterized by “the fundamentals of the knowledge 
characteristics underlying the technological regime, including the complexity, the 
tacitness, and the level of pervasiveness or scope of the technological knowledge base”. 
This technology assessment is normally associated with an intellectual property 
evaluation and the “state of the art”. Depending on the technology market, it is critical 
to measure the intellectual proprietary that could exist on a discovery. For accomplish 
this companies must analyze the patents filled in the respective regions throughout the 
patents offices existent and, in the presence of novelty use all instruments at reach, 
protecting their intellectual proprietary rights, through the submission of one or more 
patens (Clarysse et al., 2005). 
In face of a new technological discovery the corporation management has several 
instruments at disposition in order to convert the invention in innovation. This 
transformation gives to the markets new value offers, increasing the economic and 
social benefits (Zahra, 1996; Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Chesbrough, 2003; 
Clarysse et al., 2005; Rohrbeck et al., 2009). The decision taken are based on 
perceptions of different kind of dimensions, like: 1) the market value evaluation, 2) the 
extent of novelty emerged, 3) the degree of appropriability, 4) the amount of expertise 
required to handle the opportunity, 5) the skills existent in the company, and 6) the 
market trends and expectations (Clarysse et al., 2005; Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 
2002). These different dimensions lead the company to choose what to do with the 
technology. The decision can be divided into two different managerial approaches. The 
first includes to maintain the discovery in house throughout options that can go from 
(Zahra, 1996; Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Chesbrough, 2003; Clarysse et al., 
2005; Rohrbeck et al., 2009; Narayanan et al., 2009): 1) doing nothing putting the 
technology in “shelf” to use later on, 2) passing through the possibility of including the 
discovery in the current core business contributing to a incremental product innovation, 
3) to the creation of a new product/service increasing the diversity, and 4) for seeking to 
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sale or license the technology to other firms and in this way guaranteeing some profit. 
The second option is to use a corporate venturing mechanism, which can pass through a 
company spin-off or a joint-venture with other firm, externalizing the development and 
commercialization of the discovery (Antoncic and Hisrich, 2001; Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom, 2002; Chesbrough, 2003; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Clarysse et al., 
2005; Rohrbeck et al., 2009). 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002) highlight the importance of making a business 
plan so that the commercial potential of the technology could be evaluated. The authors 
argue that only the right business model can unleash the value existent in technology, 
and even then it could remain uncertain until the commercialization stage. However, 
corporation management should be aware that successful business models might not fit 
the circumstances of technology or a market opportunity (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 
2002). Many technology entrepreneurs have protected their position and extraordinary 
returns by integrating their innovations in an existing value chain (Gans and Stern, 
2003). In the literature we can be find several worldwide companies (e.g. 3Com, Adobe, 
Sun, Intel) that started by using this strategy and opening their way to success 
(Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Gans and Stern, 2003). 
In the decision process one of the crucial factors that encourage the spin-off process is 
the positive link relations that will exist between the two companies. These relations 
will promote synergies and knowledge transfers. Allowing the corporation to stay 
focused, or in some cases makes a refocus on the commercialization of its core 
business, controlling more easily complementarities that can be created (Gans and 
Stern, 2003). 
In addition, for companies that have implemented processes to explore technology, both 
in products or markets, corporate spin-offs offer a mean of acquirement skills that 
facilitate the understanding and knowledge of new markets, through the entering of a 
specific product, getting gradually a steady position and tacit market knowledge (Gans 
and Stern, 2003). 
Another factor that weights in the spin-off decision is the market pressure to which the 
company is exposed. Costumers demand better, cheaper and more advanced products. 
Additionally, the technology uncertainty is very high. These factors combined create 
substantial threats to the incumbent companies, being even more critical in the 
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technology markets. Companies react to these risks by forecasting technology 
innovation, costumer trends and demands (Zahra, 1996).  
Another important factor, pointed out by some authors such as Rohrbeck et al. (2009), 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002), or Zahra (1996), is the company’s technology 
strategy or market position. The latter author argues that in technology markets 
“[c]ompanies often use pioneering offensively to capture premium segments, achieve 
economies of scale, set industry standards, or control distribution channels” (Zahra, 
1996: 193), more often. Furthermore, Zahra et al. (1999), following the Porter 
framework, suggest that a corporation can be compelled to spin-off companies, creating 
a competitive advantage by creating barriers to competitors’ entrance. We cannot forget 
to point out that, according to the Zahra et al. (1999), the hostility in these kind of 
markets have a negative impact in the market’s growth in a long run, decreasing the 
R&D expenses, and diminishing spin-off’s dynamics. The authors suggested that 
because of this in the last few years the R&D investment has declined in the USA. 
In the decision of setting up a spin-off a company’s corporation management takes into 
consideration the fact that, associated to the new, light and fresh company there is a 
positive pressure of taking technology quickly into the market, and therefore, achieve 
success (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Zahra et al., 2007). According to Zahra et al. 
(2007), “focusing on a few specific product applications, corporate spin-offs can quickly 
address customers’ needs, thereby contributing to the corporate spin-off’s growth”. 
However, Nelson (1991) argued in the path of the spin-off it should pass through 
increase the scope of the technology, diversifying market applications, and in this way 
minimizing risks and amortizing the costs. Therefore, the management of the 
company’s product portfolio is critical, meaning that having a large number of products 
is not always conducive to performance and profit (Zahra, 1996). 
Possessing potential technologies corporations undertake the process of funding these 
operations (Clarysse et al., 2005). According to Clarysse et al. (2005), this process put 
into practice can be very complex. The success of the spin-off is directly associated with 
the star-up resources (Davila et al., 2003). Davila et al. (2003) argues that the spin-off 
funding event provides a credible and strong signal to the market. The market 
perception can be explained by (Davila et al., 2003): 1) venture capital capacity to 
invest in potential projects, 2) venture capitalist participation in the board and the active 
role that they will have in the spin-off governance perspective, 3) venture capitalist 
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bring a network of contacts and influence brought by venture capitalist, 4) venture 
capitalist bring reputation effect that facilitates the growth brought by venture capitalist. 
The market reaction tends to be a reflection of a company’s potential and for this reason 
Sullivan and Marvel’s (2011) research suggests that market knowledge is a critical 
factor allowing companies to refine and adjust their products or services to the market 
needs or demands. 
The localization of a spin-off is a determinant factor for the success of the new company 
(Zucker and Darby, 1998). We cannot oversight the externalities that the company will 
get by being near of what really matters to it. Zucker and Darby (1998) argue that in 
case of science based industries the links and relations among scientists are a key 
element. In other words, because the replications are not widely known prior to the 
discovery, any scientist wishing to build on the new knowledge has to first acquire 
hands-on experience. This tacit relation is critical for the course of technology 
innovation as well as in the complementarily that could be gained. The Silicon Valley is 
proof that these tacit relations, experience share, are determinant to a company’s 
success.  
Another important key element in the spin-off process and its success is the human 
capital that will be at disposal. According to Clarysse et al., (2005), there are six types 
of resources critical for the spin-off: human, social, financial, physical, technology, and 
organizational. The human and social factors are major success keys, mainly in the 
technology spin-off. Here the know-how and the innovative and entrepreneurship skills 
will be determinant in the new company’s life and success. The spin-off should contain 
highly educated, ambitious and motivated employees’ (Davenport et al., 2002). These 
factors must be taken into account at the time of the creation of the spin-off by the 
parent company. 
The final phase of the spin-off’s creation process is the definition of the stakeholder 
structure. Even in this phase of creation it is critical to identify capabilities gaps, so they 
can be leaded in a renewed strategy. Many common strategies are alliances or hiring 
specific human resources and filling the existent gaps converting threats in 
opportunities. The knowledge of agents involved in the product creation, since it 
conveys the approach and linkage creation between key agents, increasing the 
competitiveness of the value chain (Davenport et al., 2002). 
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Corporation management cannot forget that the new company will be deeply connected 
to its origin with Zahra et al. (2007) arguing that knowledge and experiences that a 
company has at its birth will be determinant when explaining the course that it will take. 
The authors argue that it is reasonable to assume that spin-offs’ capabilities are linked to 
an inherited knowledge. 
Finally, it is important to mention the insight that has led to the creation of a spin-off. 
Several authors argue that conceptualization and visioning of the technology 
capabilities motivates us to achieve what has been foreseen (Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom, 2002; Clarysse et al., 2005; Zahra et al., 2007). Furthermore, the sharing 
of this knowledge and vision about technology, industry, or market, leads to findings of 
multiple uses for their assets, helping on the identification of potential customers and 
new opportunities. According to Zahra et al. (2007: 577), “the better the spin-offs’ 
conceptualization and visioning capability, the higher their chances of finding 
commercial uses for their products and achieving high performance.”. 
Based on the different steps involved in the decision process of a spin-off creation 
mention previously, we create a model that aims to explain the technology spin-off’s 
decision process.  It is highlighted four distinct, although not completely independent, 
phases (Figure 4): 1) the technology that have emerged, with all that surrounds and 
influences it, from the R&D to the technology market trends (‘Technology 
Opportunity’); 2) the evaluation that is performed with all options available to 
management to take the opportunity, we underline as mention previously the 
importance of this phase be followed by the creation of the right business plan 
(Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002) (‘Opportunity Evaluation’); 3) top management 
decision, evaluating not only the opportunity but several other different dimensions (eg. 
Market Value, Market share, the degree of novelty, skills and competences needed, the 
costumer and market trend, the long tail company’s strategy, the network partners 
available to leveraged the opportunity, and the competitors rivalry) that can lead the 
decision to success (‘Management’); and 4) in the need of investment, it is evaluated all 
the possibilities, and in this step may even change the decision made (‘Investment’). 
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Figure 4: The decision process of a Spin-Off’s creation 
 
Recall that the four distinct phases are not completely independent. The model provides 
the possibility in each step to give a feedback to the previous phase, aligning the 
technology that could be discovered with the direction/strategy pressure by management 
or giving inputs for refining the discovery to meet the market needs. 
1.3.3. ‘Performance’  
From an economic perspective there are two main benefits that might be achieved from 
the creation of a spin off (Zahra, 1996; Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; 
Chesbrough, 2003; Agarwall et al., 2004; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Narayanan et al., 
2009): 1) increase the returns to shareholders by the use of the technological discovery, 
2) its growth, presenting positive economic returns, obtained from the refocus strategy 
followed. 
The impact of a new company on the market will be deeply connected to the market’s 
perception of the potential that it possesses at the time of its entry. Among others, 
potential customers, distribution channels, the company’s position in the value chain, its 
partners influence the referred to perception. They also reflect on the market’s level of 
adherence (Sullivan and Marvel, 2011). 
In fact, according with Daley et al. (1997), only the cross-industry spin-offs are 
associated with positive and significant economic returns around announcements. The 
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authors argue that this evidence is consistent with the results from asset sale studies. 
However, the spin-off operation allows managers the freedom to deal with unrelated 
activities from the core business of the parent company, as to consequently improve the 
corporation performance (John and Ofek, 1995; Daley et al., 1997). John and Ofek 
(1995) and Daley et al (1997) refer to this as the ‘Corporate Focus Hypothesis’. The 
authors argue that when focusing in the core business and in the elimination of negative 
synergies that exist between the divested and the remaining, the performance will 
increase. In addition, performance increase may occur due to alignments between 
managers and shareholders. The spin-off process allows companies, both parent and the 
new born, to review existing contracts in the chain value as well as existing objectives 
and contracts with managers, and also, to improve the performance as a whole (Daley et 
al., 1997). 
The belief that a spin-off will improve value to the economy is aligned with the positive 
effects surrounding the spin-off’s announcement (Schipper and Smith, 1983; Cusatis et 
al., 1993; Chemmanur and Yan, 2004; Rovetta, 2006; Harris and Glegg, 2008). These 
spin-off announcements not only have positive effects in the companies involved, but 
also bring positive returns for the competition (Harris and Glegg, 2008). The price’s 
response to announcements is higher when the operations take place in markets where 
takeovers are more active and frequent; this happens because there is a possibility that 
the spun-off company will become a target for an acquisition (Harris and Glegg, 2008). 
According to Schipper and Smith (1983), evidence shows that these transactions have 
positive stock returns at around 3%, on the average. 
Further, the price’s reaction tends to be sensitive to countries’ legislation, being higher 
in those with a better legal protection over outside shareholders. Harris and Glegg 
(2008: 462), suggest that “cross-border spin-offs that lead to adverse changes in investor 
protection are associated with lower wealth effects”. According to Schipper and Smith 
(1983: 437), “[t]he gains to shareholders may arise from relaxed regulatory and tax 
constraints and improved managerial efficiency”. 
The positive price reaction around announcements dates reflects investors’ expectations 
about the value creation potential, unleashed to the markets with the spin-off. There is 
the outlook that the spin-off parent company will increase the performance as the 
decision taken is clear signal to markets of the strategy being followed (Cusatis et al., 
1993; John and Ofek, 1995; Chemmanur and Yan, 2004). Further, these abnormal 
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returns are also associated with the corporation restructuration, and the expectation that 
it will be more agile and competitive (Cusatis et al., 1993).  
There is evidence that spin-offs experience more takeovers, when investors failed to 
anticipate the value creation brought by the spin-off (Cusatis et al., 1993; Chemmanur 
and Yan, 2004). According to Chemmanur and Yan (2004), the increase of these 
takeovers happens for the right reason: the pursuit of value improvement by top 
management. 
From the market’s point of view, the spin-offs process, which divides a company into 
separate businesses, provides bidders the opportunity to create value by giving them a 
relatively low cost channel to transfer control from corporate asset to acquiring firms 
(Cusatis et al., 1993; Harris and Glegg, 2008). 
According to Rovetta (2006), positive reactions verified by markets, due to a spin off 
process, reflect a perception of improvement in capital allocations. New companies tend 
to put their faith and strengths in segments with high growth opportunities and potential. 
A spin-off creation changes the environmental background of companies. The spin-off 
process increases the information that breaks out to the market and so, it increases the 
knowledge on the companies in order to observe closely and inform traders (Huson and 
Mackinnon, 2003). These reduce inter-shareholder information asymmetry allows a 
more detailed evaluation of the company. The days following the announcements the 
trade’s transactions increase deeply, and informed traders with a superior knowledge 
take advantage and profit from the least informed (Huson and Mackinnon, 2003). 
The literature indentifies several factors that can explain the market’s behaviour, as 
mentioned above, such as: 1) tax and regulatory benefits (Schipper and Smith, 1983); 2) 
low cost transfer channels between companies (Cusatis et al., 1993; Harris and Glegg, 
2008); 3) increased corporate focus (John and Ofek, 1995; Daley et al., 1997); 4) 
increase the efficient contracting in the chain value (Schipper and Smith, 1983); 5) less 
information asymmetry (Huson and Mackinnon, 2003); and 6) improvements in capital 
allocation as a new potential explanation for gains from corporate spin-offs (Rovetta, 
2006). 
It is important to mention the links existent between the parent company and the spun-
off company. These relations can deeply influence the behaviour and performance of 
both companies. Although some linkages are beneficial, if there are too many it is/can 
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be negatively received by the market (Semandeni and Cannella, 2011). Taking into 
consideration that a substantial ownership by the parent company can be harmful, after 
awhile the spun-off company could stop competing with the parent and, therefore, bring 
additional risks to the parent as incumbent(Semandeni and Cannella, 2011). Moreover, 
with a spin-off, a company loses the benefits in diversifying through operating in a 
different line of business. The company may lose the opportunity to raise its returns 
through (Berger and Ofek, 1995): 1) the enhancement in operation and administration 
efficiency, 2) the commercialization of different products, 3) the synergies existent in 
the products value chain, 3) the strengthen of the debt capacity, and 4) lower taxes. In 
this way, managers may be tempted to want their firms to engage in diversification, as it 
is a way of reducing the risks about their future compensation, and of increasing their 
power and prestige (Martin and Sayrak, 2003). 
The literature about corporation diversification and the creation of firm value is large 
and diversified (Martin and Sayrak, 2003). However, according to Martin and Sayrak 
(2003: 38), the scientific debate continues present and without a clear answer to the 
following question: “Does corporate diversification create or destroy shareholder 
value?”. 
In following chapter it is detailed the methodological considerations, aiming the answer 
of central question of the present dissertation: ‘Are technology spin-offs effective 
corporate performance instruments? ’. 
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Chapter 2. Methodological underpins 
2.1. Initial considerations 
The present dissertation aims the answering of the following question: ‘Are technology 
spin-offs effective corporate performance instruments?’. In particular, we seek to assess 
the determinants that impel the creation of a technology spin-off, and the factors behind 
the success/failure of technology spin-off in terms of value generation. Summing up, 
our aim is to study the process of emergence of corporate technological spin-offs, to 
analyze them as corporate/management performance instruments, and to assess their 
economic and financial impact at the level of the host company. The next section 
(Section 2.2.) details the framework for analyzing the selected case studies and then, in 
Section 2.3., we justify the selection of some PSI corporations as units of analysis. 
2.2. Framework of analysis 
Within the theoretical discussion on the emergence of technological spin-offs as 
corporate performance instrument (Chapter 1), two types of approaches were identified: 
one, more managerial focused, and the other, more economic based linked to the 
assessment of the financial and social benefits that can be externalized. Moreover, from 
the literature review, we conclude that two types of scientific research approaches are 
followed, the quantitative and the qualitative approaches. In a research the quantitative 
looks from general and advanced cases to a more specific one, being considered a 
deductive approach. The quantitative seeks generalization - through the analyses of the 
collected data, the researcher seeks patterns and evidence that can lead to answer the 
question under investigation at a general level.  
Most of the articles that analyze managerial problems, as well as the relationship 
between the factors that condition the firm’s behaviour and performance, tend to adopt a 
more conceptual and theoretical stance than those that are economic based. The former 
approach is typically more centered in the company and its relationships pursuing a 
more qualitative methodology. Authors like Rohrbeck et al. (2009), when analysing the 
Dutch Telecom company, Corley (2004) and Corley and Gioia (2004), who made 
several interviews to a set of companies, or Chesbrough (2003, 2002) with the research 
on the Xerox Corporation, are representative of this line of research at the empirical 
level. At a conceptual level, several studies such as Cleyn and Braet (2010), Gans and 
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Stern (2003), Davenport et al. (2002), or Zahra and George (2002), conducted a 
theoretical reflections on the theme, making an overview of the literature or debating 
the theme in question.  
Articles focusing on researching and assessing the economic and financial impacts, tend 
to be empirical and quantitative, presenting evidence on the hypotheses rose. These 
articles lean on the measuring of performance impacts, gathering the underlying data 
from international and financial databases, such as Capital IQ (John and Ofek, 1995; 
Martin and Sayrak, 2003), NYSE Euronext (John and Ofek, 1995), CRSP (Rovetta 
2006), Thomson Reuters (Harris and Glegg, 2008), Standard & Poor’s (Martin and 
Sayrak, 2003), Moody’s (Cusatis et al., 1993; Rovetta 2006). 
Being the theme of the present dissertation the technological spin-off’s emergence 
process, the determinants of the decision to create the spin off, and to assess to what 
extent the spin off contributed to the economic and financial performance of the host 
company, it is our intention to follow a qualitative approach, based on a content 
analysis. The content analysis allows the researcher to test theoretical issues enhancing 
the understanding of the data, and helping to get answer to the researcher questions.  
In Figure 5 it is summarized the process analyzes that was used to conduct our 
investigation and research. 
 
Figure 5: Qualitative process analyses 
Source: Author 
Our qualitative research analyses are based on the investigation of several relevant 
Portuguese companies which belong to the Portuguese Stock Index (PSI).  
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Given our theoretical framework, and based on publically available companies’ annual 
reports, from 2007 to 2010, the investigation includes the evaluation of each company 
in different dimensions namely, its historical past, long run strategy, financial 
performance, and spin-offs created. The goal of this content analyses is to identify the 
main key drivers of companies’ decision to create spin offs and the outcome that was 
generate by firms of using spin-offs as a management instrument. 
2.3. Reasoning for selecting PSI corporations as unit of analysis  
The option for companies indexed in PSI has to do with the possibility of accessing 
freely to the relevant and needed information (these firms are legally binding to 
disclosure financial and information on mergers, acquisitions and starting of new 
companies). 
Moreover, the PSI group comprise firms that area quite distinct in terms of business 
scope, size and strategies, enabling to study the process of spin off creation involving 
complementary dimensions: 1) different scale; 2) different geographical areas; 3) 
different branches of business; 4) with different (strategic) experiences and routes. 
With these dimensions in mind, we decided to analyze 4 companies (out of the 20 that 
are included in PSI): Martifer, SA; EDP-Energias de Portugal, SA; Galp-Energia, SA; 
and Sonae-SGPS. 
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Chapter 3. Technology spin-off as corporate performance 
instruments. Results from the qualitative analyses on the 
some PSI corporations 
3.1. Initial considerations  
In order to perform our qualitative research it was conducted an investigation on several 
relevant companies from the Portuguese enterprise tissue belonging to the PSI 
(Portuguese Stock Index), with distinct characteristics, and belonging to different 
economic sectors. The investigation encompasses the evaluation of the company’s 
strategy, financial performance and spin off decision process, through the content 
analyses of its annual reports from 2007 to 2010. The selected companies are: Martifer, 
EDP-Energias de Portugal, Galp-Energia, and Sonae-SGPS.  
Being the goal of our study to assess the determinants that impel the creation of a 
technology spin-off by the selected companies, specifically identifying the factors 
behind the success/failure of technology spin-off in terms of value generation, given 
that global macroeconomic performance of the country can constraint companies’ 
economic performance, in the chapter we decided to start (Section 3.2.) by providing a 
brief account of the  macroeconomic context of the world economy over the period in 
study (2007 to 2010). In the following section (Section 3.3.) we present the content 
analysis for each company. We close the chapter (Section 3.3.) with a synthesis of the 
results wrapped into our theoretical frame. 
3.2. A brief account of the world macroeconomic context over the period 2007-
2010
3
 
In 2007 the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measured in purchasing power parity 
exchange rates increased by 4.9%, which represented a deceleration from 2006 (0.1% 
lower growth rate recorded in 2006).  
The economic activity decelerated in the advanced economies, particularly in the United 
States, where the crisis in the subprime mortgage market affected a broad range of 
financial markets and institutions. However, the strong overall economic performance 
                                                 
3
 This macroeconomic analysis was made based on the International Monetary Fund reports, namely that 
of 2010 (IMF, 2010). 
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continued to reflect, to a large extent, the economic growth in the emerging countries 
(7.7%). China, Russia and India accounted for half of global economic growth. 
In the first half of 2007, the European Central Bank (ECB) adopted a tighter monetary 
policy (with the reference interest rate increased by 50 basis points by July, to 4%), in 
order to control inflationary pressures resulting from the positive economic performance 
and due the rise of the price of petroleum. From July of 2007, the ECB has caught the 
upward trend in the reference interest rate, in response to the liquidity problem in 
financial markets resulting from the crisis observed in the U.S. sub-prime crisis and 
consequent financial confidence. Through this policy, the ECB kept rate disinflation the 
target of 2.0% for the Eurozone. In the EU, inflation reached 2.3%. 
In 2008, and according to IMF, the world economy registered a growth rate of 3.4%, 
decelerating 2.8% over 2007. The deepening financial crisis from autumn was on 
slowdown. Despite having slowed from 8.3% in 2007 to 6.3% in 2008, the growth in 
the emerging countries continued to contribute significantly to global growth. Advanced 
economies were responsible for the slowdown, slowing from growth of 2.7% in 2007 to 
1.0% in 2008. 
The rapid economic downturn was the most unusual feature of 2008, created by the sub-
prime crisis. The impact of the financial crisis on the real economy became more 
pronounced from the fall, and the Eurozone entered its first technical recession at the 
end of 2008. Both the European Union and ZE have slowed relative to 2007 
performance 1.0% in 2008 (2.9% in 2007) and ZE 0.9% (2.7 in 2007), mainly due to the 
slowdown in investment and private consumption. 
According to IMF in 2009, in the IMF (Annual Report 2010 Supporting a Balanced 
Global Recovery, 2010: 9), the “[p]olicymakers responded to the crisis by implementing 
a set of bold and aggressive monetary, fiscal, and financial sector policy measures that 
were delivered in an environment of unprecedented cooperation. These concerted policy 
actions were successful in arresting and then reversing the downward economic spiral. 
Financial market conditions improved, and the first signs of an emerging recovery 
became evident in the second half of 2009, with growth gaining steam in early 2010. 
Nevertheless, the recovery remained moderate and uneven, with advanced country 
growth relatively weak, but emerging markets and low-income countries generally 
rebounding strongly.” 
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Despite de intervention performed by the major economic institutions (FED, ECB, BE, 
among others) the year 2009 was characterized by a strong deceleration of activity in 
major economic areas. This development was mainly driven by a significant 
deterioration in economic confidence, leading to a fall in demand and the collapse of 
international trade flows in the first half of the year. The recession was a scenario of 
lower availability of liquidity in financial markets and, as a result, an environment of 
tightening of financing economic activity. Authorities responded by reducing the 
benchmark interest below 1%, the massive injection of liquidity into the financial 
system and at the level of fiscal policy through tax incentives the consumption of 
durable goods and an increase in public investment in infrastructure. The aggressiveness 
of these stimuli was observed in the second half of the year, and especially in the fourth 
quarter signs of accelerating economic activity and financial stabilization. 
In 2010, and according to IMF, the global economy recovered, although growth 
remained uneven across countries. In many advanced countries, growth continued to be 
relatively weak, held back by high unemployment rates, weak financial conditions, and 
concerns about the fiscal and financial sector outlook. Difficulties in a number of 
European countries have been particularly acute, and among those with problems was 
Portugal, with strong problems with public debt. In contrast, growth in emerging 
markets was strong but with inflation rising and growing concerns about overheating in 
a number of these economies. 
3.3. Martifer 
3.3.1. Brief description of the company 
The company was created in February of 1990 as a private limited company with a 
social capital of 22.500€ and headquarters in the Industrial Zone of Oliveira de Frades 
(Viseu, Centre of Portugal), this headquarters has been maintained until today. In 26 of 
May of 1998 the company is transformed into a corporation, changing its shareholder 
structure. The social capital started to be shared by the I’M – SGPS (Carlos Manuel 
Marques Martins, Jorge Alberto Marques Martins, and other shareholders), SA and FM 
– Sociedade de Controlo, SGPS, SA (Mota-Engil – SGPS, SA, and other shareholders). 
From the start the Martifer’s core business has been the metallurgical constructions. The 
shareholder structure, included large building companies, has leveraged Martifer’s 
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business since during this period many consortiums have been created between them 
permitting Martifer to earn large international/national projects. 
3.3.2. Corportate spin offs decision process  
In 2004, Martifer starts the activity in the sector of renewable energy equipments 
through the creation of the Martifer Energy Systems (see Figure 5). Initially this 
company was dedicated to the manufacturing of metallic towers to wind turbines. This 
spin-off creation has been largely motivated by the Portuguese energy policy, motivated 
by the Portuguese government’s strategic decision to invest in renewable energy like the 
wind and the solar, taking advantage of the natural conditions of the country. Martifer’s 
know-how on metallurgical constructions and the national policy opportunities, 
conjugated with the trend about renewable energy all over the world (e.g., the 
Netherland first sea wind turbines, seen as symbols of a greener and prospect future 
society), fostered the creation of Martifer Energy Systems.  
 
Figure 6: Martifer’s main events: time scale  
Based on our theoretical framework/model, the Martifer Energy Systems might be 
indeed classified as a technological spin-off, where the key vector elements of its 
creation were; 1) the strong human capital basis of the company in metallic 
manufacturing; 2) national business opportunity; 3) technological trends and 
international market prospect existent; 4) wind turbines technology potential; 5) and 
very strong shareholders, with high financial capacity, that could support the 
investment. 
Derived from investments in Romania, in the sector of Agriculture and Biofuels, 
Martifer creates, in 2005, Prio, SA. Martifer took the opportunity of Romanian 
environmental funds, focused on the renewable energies, were the refundable financings 
went directly to the companies. In this way Prio, SA, owned in 60% by Martifer, started 
the agricultural production of oilseeds and the biodiesel production, in line with the 
investment in the greener energies. With this subsidiary, Martifer Corporation was able 
to access to all biofuel business chain value, and take advantage of the increasing 
 30 
distribution network. Prio, SA, being also a technological spin-off, was born from the 
business opportunity and from the market prospect around the biofuel. 
Still in 2005, Martifer continues its bet in wind towers, acquiring 25.4% share (12.5M€) 
of the German company Repower Systems AG, one of the greatest manufactures 
worldwide of wind turbines. In the same year, it was created REPower Portugal, SA. 
This company was shared equally between Martifer Energy Systems, SA and REPower 
Systems AG. This subsidiary gave Martifer access and control to the entire chain value 
wind towers’ production, increasing Martifer’s capacity of response in the sector.  
Furthermore, and still in the same year of 2005, Martifer creates Martifer Renewables, 
SA, with the main purpose of centralizing management of all activities in the promotion 
and exploration of renewable energy. This company aimed the management of the 
energy power generation potentiated by wind or solar parks created by Martifer or a 
Consortium. As such, the specific know-how needed to handle and manage this kind of 
high tech energy parks pushed the creation of this technological spin-off.  
Once more, analysing Martifer Renewables, SA according to our model (Figure 2), we 
can stated that it constitutes a technological spin-off, where the key vector elements of 
its creation were; 1) the strong human capital basis of the mother company in renewable 
energy; 2) national business opportunity (exploration required in the national public 
procurement); 3) synergies and complementarities that can be obtain; and 5)  the 
existence of very strong shareholders that could support the investment. 
In 2006, as product of the research made within Martifer Energy System in the sector of 
renewable energy, two different spin-off companies were created. The first, 
PowerBlades, SA, developed technology to wind turbines. And the second, Martifer 
Solar, SA, was responsible to develop photoelectric solar panels. Following our model, 
both companies are technological spin-offs, however the key vector elements of their 
creation were different. In case of Martifer Solar, SA, the main drivers were: 1) the 
strong human capital developed in the Martifer Energy System; 2) the national business 
opportunities; 3) the increasing international market prospect; 4) photoelectric solar 
panels technology potential; and 5) very strong stakeholders that could support the 
investment. In the case of the PowerBlades, SA, the main drivers were: 1) the 
technology potential; and 2) the synergies and complementarities that could be gain 
with the REPower Portugal, SA. 
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In 2007, Martifer created a new company the Martifer Inovação e Gestão, SA, 
centralizing shared services, an excellence center, and the research and development 
activities of the Martifer’s Group. 
In 2008, Martifer Energy Systems created a new spin-off, the Home Energy, SA, 
holding a share of 41.3%. This company aimed at the energy certifications required in 
property transactions starting from January of 2009, and also the segment of micro-
generation of energy by installing solar panels. Analysing this Home Energy according 
our model the main drivers of its creation were: 1) the strong human capital developed 
in the Martifer Energy System; 2) the national business opportunities created with the 
new legislation; 3) the increasing market prospect; 4) the residential photoelectric solar 
panels technology potential; and 5) the very strong stakeholders that could support the 
investment. 
In the same year Martifer agreed the selling of Repower System AG’s share to the 
Suzlon. This operation permitted Martifer to receive 205M€. 
In 2009, Martifer decided to redefine its strategy, following a refocus approach, 
reducing its interest in the sector of Agriculture and Biofuels. 
In 2011, Martifer agreed to sell to the Repower System AG and Power Blade, SA, the 
REPower Portgual, SA. 
3.3.3. The impact of corportate spin offs on company’s performance  
Analysing the Martifer’s corporation performance (Table 1), it is clear that during the 
period under analysis the company changed the strategy, trying to adapt to the 
international and national economic  environment.  
Table 1: Performance results of Martifer (M€) from 2007 to 2010 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Martifer (consolidated) 37,0 67,1 66,8 59,0 
Martifer Aluminios 28,0 34,7 37,1 16,3 
Martifer Energy Systems na na na na 
REPower Portugal  17,2 11,2 -4,9 
PowerBlade     
Martifer Renewables -0,5 2,6 4,3 17,9 
Martifer Solar  9,2 12,5 22,2 
HomeEnergy   sold  
Note: na – not available 
Source: Author based on financial reports of the company. 
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The first bet on wind towers, through the company REPower Portugal, showed very 
positive signs in a first stage but with the arise of the sovereignty public debt crisis the 
business prospects decreased drastically. This crisis has also affected Martifer 
Alumínios that in 2011 presented a negative EBITDA result of 20,1M€. According 
Martifer’s financial report this result is explained by: 1) the unfavorable industry 
environment; 2) the negative margins in Eastern Europe and Australia; 3) integration of 
wind cluster in metal construction; and 4) the unexpected postponement of some 
projects in the portfolio, which to a large extent might be explained by the cuts in the 
public investment. 
Given that, the results presented in the annual financial reports are by business sector 
activity, we fail to access the performance indicators by Martifer Energy System, as this 
firm is transversal to all business sectors considered - this company, which is based in 
engineering services, supports the other business units. Nevertheless, taking into 
account that it has generated several spin-offs, one might reasonably assume that its 
performance was positive. 
The analysis of Martifer Renewables, leads to the conclusion that the energy generation 
sector evidenced very positive signs, maintaining a sustainable increasing return. 
Similarly, Martifer Solar evidenced a sustainable growth, which could be explained by 
the possibility to address the domestic electric market. 
Summing up, the spin-off strategies permitted Martifer to growth and diversify. 
However, being its main activity very dependent on public investment, with the 
emergence of the international debt crisis the corporation showed a significant decrease 
in its performance, which could be much worse in the absence of the positive behavior 
of the Martifer Renewables and Martifer Solar, which compensated the negative 
performance of the other (more) traditional business segments.  
3.4. EDP - Energias de Portugal 
3.4.1. Brief description of the company 
The EDP Corporation is one of the largest companies in the PSI - Portuguese Stock 
Index, and ranks among Europe's major electricity operators. EDP has been created in 
1976, through the fusion of 13 companies that had been nationalized in 1975. At that 
time, as a state-owned company, it was granted the responsibility to handle the 
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electrification of all country, electric distribution, planning and building of the domestic 
electricity generation, establishing of a single tariff for all customers. In 1991, the 
Portuguese government decided to modify its juridical status changing it to a 
corporation. In June of 1997 occurred the first phase of privatization of EDP, with the 
selling of 30% of the company’s capital. After this phase, five more phases of 
privatization followed: May of 1998, June of 1998, October 2000, November 2004, and 
December of 2005. With the privatization, the company changed its strategy and 
ambition, starting the first steps towards the internationalization. This strategy led that 
the company to become the first Iberian company to own significant generating and 
distribution assets in both sides of the border. This was achieved with the acquisition of 
a controlling position in the Spanish company HC Energía.  
Today it is present in several electricity sectors worldwide, with a major presence in the 
United States and Brazil, through the generation, distribution and trading businesses of 
electricity. 
Initially the business activities of EDP were focused on the generation and distribution 
of electric power. However, the fast growth and the aim for business expansion led the 
company to enter in different (although highly complementary) areas, such as the gas 
exploration, engineering, and information technologies. The company has entered into 
businesses sectors, such as the IT Consulting through the Edinfor, or even 
telecommunications market through the ONI Telecom. Later on, given the scanty 
success in these sectors, the company sold the positions to Logica and to the Riverside 
Company.  
In 2004, the company changed image and name to EDP – Energias de Portugal. In 
2006, the company changed the positioning, and like the Martifer, this change was 
largely motivated by the Portuguese energy policy with its focuson the investment in 
renewable energy, namely the wind and the solar energy, taking advantage of the 
natural conditions of the country. This strategic change was followed by a new slogan 
“feel our energy”. 
In December of 2011, Portuguese government sold its share in EDP (21,4%) to the 
China Three Gorges Corporation. This operation was largely motivated by the changing 
in government executive and by the agreement made with Troika (FMI, CEB, EC), 
within the PortugueseStabilization and Growth Plan. 
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In the last years and led by Antonio Mexia, EDP corporation have increase the 
international expansion. This strategy has been based in three vectors; 1) controlled risk; 
2) Efficiency; and 3) Oriented Growth. This vision has been (and will be) applied to 
three quadrennials: 1) 2006-2008: increase the investment in different areas and 
different options of growth; 2) 2009 -2012: focus on the execution and 
operationalization of the investment; and 3) +2012: to increase the cash flow earnings. 
This strategy was focused on business growth, through investment on sector 
complementarities to the core business. 
The strategy of value creation defined, was based in some principles that explain how 
the expansion was conducted, especially in what regards to the technology spin-off 
creation. In this way the EDP defined that the value creation should follow the 
following vales; 1) reach objectives; 2) create value through attractive investments; 3) 
low exposition to the market; 4) investments with high visibility and flexibility; and 5) 
focus on the efficiency and discipline. 
Following the strategy routed, the company invests in the Iberia Peninsula, organizing 
the business in; 1) Energy Production (with long tail production contracts, liberalization 
energy production); 2) Energy Distribution; and 3) Energy Commercialization. In 
addition, the company decided to invest in the natural gas, following the global 
consumer trends that demands cleaner and cheaper energy.  
Internationally the company continued the investments made in Brazil, increasing its 
position in what was considered strategic market for the company.  
3.4.2. Corportate spin offs’ decision process  
Figure 7 depicts some of the main events which marked EDP over the last years and 
which are detailed in what follows. 
 
Figure 7: EDP’s chronological main events: time scale 
 
In 1976, after the revolution of 25 April 1975, the Portuguese regime change from an 
authoritarian dictatorship (the Estado Novo) into a democracy, that produced enormous 
social, economic, territorial, demographic, and political changes in the country, creating 
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a two years transitional period known as PREC (Processo Revolucionário Em Curso, or 
On-Going Revolutionary Process), characterized by social turmoil and power disputes 
between left and right wing political forces. EDP emerged through the fusion of 13 
companies. 
In 1994 it was created the EDP – Gestão e Produção de Energia, aiming at promoting 
and managing all EDP’s facilities, ventures or activities in sector of production and 
energy selling, in the form of electricity. This company had the objective to elaborate 
studies or develop projects related with the energy production or commercialization. 
Applying our model, this company was not a technology spin-off, being trigged by 
business motivations. The main drivers of this creation were; 1) the strong knowledge 
existent in EDP; and 2) company reorganization sector activity. 
In 2003, and within the scope of the privatization process of Naturgas Energia Grupo 
which occurred in 2003, Hidroeléctrica Del Cantábrico. (HC), (96,86% owned by EDP) 
acquired a controlling stake in Naturgas and closed with Ente Vasco De La Energia 
(EVE), a shareholder agreement valid until July 30th, 2010, which included a put option 
for part or the whole of EVE’s stake in Naturgas, to be exercised at market value until 
July 30th, 2010. This operation, gave EDP access to the gas activities of distribution in 
low pressure and commercialization on the regions of Canábria and Múrcia and the 
activities of high pressure gas on the regions of Pais Basco, Asturias and Cantábria for 
the value of 330 Millions of Euros. 
The completion of this transaction depended on some required approvals, in particular 
the approval by the Basque Country’s parliament. With this deal HC will reinforce its 
position in Naturgas to 95% until the end of the first half of 2013, having the possibility 
to own the whole capital of the company from 1st of June 2016. This is an important 
step in EDP’s consolidation of its Spanish shareholdings and gas Iberian operations, 
increasing efficiency improvement possibilities and the achievement of additional intra 
group synergies. 
Naturgas operates in the distribution, transmission, purchase and sale of natural gas in 
Spain through 8,736Kms of distribution network and 974 thousand of points of supply, 
a 387Kms transmission network, and natural gas sales of 2.5bcms/year (29TWh) to its 
822 thousand supply clients. 
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Applying our model in order to explain the acquisition, it is clear once more that behind 
this operation was business motivations. Despite this operation has been made in 2003, 
it followed the same strategic principles communicated in 2006. The acquisition 
although have involved a considerable investment, had low risk, very low exposition to 
the market, and high visibility. The main drivers of this acquisition were; 1) the strong 
knowledge existent in EDP in sector distribution and commercialization; 2) seeking to 
diversify and enter in the natural gas sector; 3) definition of Spain as one of primary 
markets to expand; 4) trend on consumer habit of natural gas; 5) strong shareholders 
that made possible the investment, and 6) the complementarities expected to have with 
the Energy production.  
In October of 2004, the company changed the name, from EDP – Electricidade de 
Portugal, SA to EDP – Energias de Portugal. It was not clear why this was made. 
However, analyzing the strategy that was communicated in 2006, and the different 
investments made in previous years, namely the acquisition of Naturgas, the name 
change may have been a consequence of the company market reposition, as earlier 
referred. 
In 2005, it is created the EDP – Brasil, aiming to promote, and manage, all facilities, 
projects and activities in the production and sale of energy, particularly in the form of 
electricity in the Brasil. The company is a holding managing several activities in a few 
states like São Paulo, Espirito Santo, Mato Grosso do Sul, Tocantis, Ceará, among 
others.  
In 2006, EDP communicated its long run strategy, making public the interest in the 
renewable energies.  Still in 2006, it was created the EDP – Serviços Universais, which 
was a company with the purpose of buying and selling electric energy, working as a 
supplier of last resort. The company holds a license of supplier of last resort, issued by 
the Directorate General for Energy and Geology (DGEG), and it was subjected to a set 
of public service obligations, including: universal provision of electricity supply to all 
customers eligible upon request, protection of consumers. Applying our model in order 
to explain this creation, it is clear once more that behind this operation was business and 
profit seeking motivations. In this way the main drivers of this creation were; 1) the 
strong knowledge existent in EDP in sector of distribution and commercialization 
electricity; 2) strong stakeholders that made possible the investment and also make 
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possible to buy the license of supplier of last resort; 3) to defend market position; and 4) 
the complementarities expected to have with the electrical production.  
In 2007, it was created the EDP – Renovaveis, with purpose to explore, develop and 
manage renewable energy, establishing its headquarters in Madrid. Today EDP 
Renováveis is the third-largest generator of wind energy worldwide (after Iberdrola 
Renovables and NextEra Energy Resources), being one of biggest Portuguese 
companies, is present in the PSI-20.  
EDP took advantage of the European Policy defined in European Commission, which 
encouraged the countries to invest in renewable energy. This was followed by several 
countries like, Portugal, Spain, Poland, among others. In case of Portugal it was 
considered a strategic investment by the left wing government of José Socrates, seen as 
a way to reduce the country’s energetic dependency.  
Applying our model in order to explain the EDP – Renovaveis’ emergence it is clear 
once more that behind this operation stood business and market prospect and 
opportunity. However, we consider that this company is a technology spin-off. Our 
arguments are based on the fact that the EDP Corporation has been developing work in 
their R&D labs in order to explore other forms of energy creation like wind and solar 
energy. In this way the main drivers of this spin-off were; 1) the strong knowledge 
existent in EDP in sector distribution and commercialization; 2) the human capital 
acquired in their R&D labs about renewable energy; 2) need to diversify and enter in the 
green energy; 3) market potential, national (exploration required in the national public 
procurement) and international; 4) trend on consumer demands; 5) strong shareholders 
that made possible the investment; and 6) the complementarities expected to have with 
the Energy production like Hydro (Electric Dams, and the possibility use the very low 
cost of electric energy in dawn to invert the water flow and fill the reservoir) and 
Energy Distribution. 
In 2008, it was created the EDP Gás Serviço Universal, owned in 100% by EDP – 
Energias Portugal, which is a company that has the purpose of buying and selling 
natural gas, working as a supplier of last resort, for the concession zone given to EDP 
Gás e Distribuição, being responsible for the supply of gas in the regulated market. The 
access to the license of supplier of last resort of gas is in line with the strategy defined, 
leveraging the infrastructure that had been invested, using synergies and 
complementarities with the several companies of gas, but also with the sector of 
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electricity. Applying our model in order to explain the creation of this company, it is 
clear once more that behind this operation was business and profit, aimed at reaching 
the Business to Consumer (B2C) market. In this way the main drivers of this creation 
were: 1) the strong knowledge existent in EDP in sector of distribution and 
commercialization electricity; 2) the strong knowledge existent in EDP in sector natural 
gas; 3) strong shareholders that made possible the investment and also make possible to 
buy the license of supplier of last resort; 4) hold market position; and 5) the 
complementarities expected to obtain with the electrical sector and with the business 
area of gas. 
In the recent years it was noticed a slowdown in the investment activities, which is 
aligned with the strategy defined for the period. However, some of the new companies 
that have been created are performing R&D activities in new and thrilling areas, like the 
Smarts Grids, and Electricity consumer Telemetry. This is expected to increase 
drastically the efficiency of EDP Network, and give this latter the access to new 
different business in some way related, denominated of Machine 2 Machine (M2M). In 
some way the M2M is not a market itself, but an extension of multiple vertical 
businesses that benefit from M2M communications (like the SmartGrids). The scope of 
M2M is quite broad, having potential to enhance the existing process in several 
industries, such as energy, retail, healthcare, automotive, manufacturing, to name but a 
few. The market potential is enormous, and the creations of these new companies (i.e, 
these technological spin-offs) are the proof that EDP is in front line of new technology 
and new market opportunities. On example of these new companies is InovGrid that is a 
consortium of several companies, which are developing the SmartGrid and a SmartCity 
in Évora.  
Applying our model in order to explain InovGrid emergence, we conclude that it was 
based on market opportunity and efficiency increases. It is without doubt a technology 
spin-off. Its main drivers were; 1) M2M market potential; 2) trend on consumer habits 
demanding new and more advance services; 3) increase of electrical network efficiency; 
and 4) the complementarities expected to have with the all business areas of EDP. 
3.4.3. The impact of corportate spin offs on company’s performance  
Analysing the EDP’s corporation performance, it is clear that during the period under 
analysis the company has maintained the strategy and focus and, despite the 
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international and national negative conjecture, there was no desire/need to change the 
strategy.  
During the period in analysis EDP showed strong activity and dynamism, performing 
acquisitions, operational restructures, selling what it thought that did not belong to 
company’s core business or what was not a good investment (e.g., ONI Telecom). 
The data in Table 2 shows that the enormous growth observed during the period in 
analysis (~1000Milions of Euros) was only possible with the business diversification in 
the energy sector. The activities in gas and, more important, the bet in the wind energy 
played a huge role in the performance achieved. Looking to the growth in the period 
operational profits, half of it is from the EDP Renovaveis, reflecting the importance of 
this strategic investment, drove from business opportunity, and technology know-how. 
EDP has traced a secure path, focused on the routed strategy, investing in technological 
spin-offs only when are certain of a successful outcome.  
Despite one of their biggest success (EDP Renewables) being responsible one of a spin-
off, the defensive behavior of the company could be justified by the position in market, 
that being incumbent leader, does not feel the need to take risks in market or uncertain 
technologies. 
Table 2: Performance results of EDP (M€) from 2007 to 2010 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 
Average growth 
rate (%) 
Electricity production in the Iberian Peninsula 1225 1172 1374,9 1235,1 0,9 
Electricity Production in the Iberian Peninsula 
Contracted Long-Term   
823,2 876,7  
Electricity Production in the Iberian 
Liberalized  
323 551,7 358,4  
Electricity Trading in the Iberian Peninsula 
 
32 54,7 58,2  
Electricity Distribution in the Iberian Peninsula 455 770 670,9 697,8  
Gas in the Iberian Peninsula 188,5 209 217,5 273 13,5 
Renewable (Wind) 214,5 438 542,5 712,7 53,1 
Brasil 586 562 550,2 674 5,4 
Other -42 -30 -47,9 -38  
     
 
Consolidated 2628 3155 3363 3612,8 11,4 
Source: Author based on financial reports of the company. 
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3.4.4. EDP Renewable 
Brief description of the company 
EDP Renováveis is a worldwide leading company in renewable energy. As referred, it 
was created in 2007 with purpose to explore, develop and manage renewable energy for 
the EDP Corporation. In a short period of time, the company became the third-largest 
generator of wind energy globally (after Iberdrola Renovables and NextEra Energy 
Resources). Today the company is one of largest Portuguese companies present in the 
PSI-20 and one of the few with leading technology worldwide.  
After the European Council in Lisbon (March 2000), where it was defined the vision 
and objectives for the Europe of 2010, which enlightened the need to lay the strategic 
path in a sustainable economic growth in order to achieve more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion. It was concluded that the EU had a strong energetic dependency 
(e.g., on natural gas, petroleum, coal) from other regions. In this way the EU 
encouraged investment in green energy, seeking to take advantage from the natural 
conditions of each country. During this period the European R&D investments in green 
energy spurted seeking the economic sustain.  
The EDP Renováveiswas created from the very beginning with an international 
orientation, multiplying international operations in Europe, Brazil, and even in United 
States through various businesses. 
Corportate spin offs’ decision process 
The next figure represents some of the main events around the EDP Renováveis 
Corporation that will be discussed briefly. 
 
Figure 8: EDP Renovaveis’s chronological main events: time scale 
 
After EDP Renováveis’ creation (in 2007) it was created, in 2008, the EDP Renováveis 
Brasil, holding and managing all investments concerning the green energy. Like the 
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EDP – Brasil, the EDP Renováveis Brasil was created to promote and manage all 
facilities, projects and activities in the production and sale of renewable energy in 
Brazil. Currently the company owns activities in a few states like Rio Grande do Sul 
and Santa Catarina. Applying our model in order to explain this creation, it is apparent 
that behind this operation was business and operational efficiency. In this way the main 
drivers of this creation were: 1) the strong knowledge existent in EDP in sector of 
distribution and commercialization electricity; 2) strong shareholders that made possible 
the investment; 4) hold market position; and 5) the complementarities expected to have 
with the Electrical production. 
Still in 2008, the company Horizon Wind Energy became part of EDP Renováveis. The 
company was bought by EDP – Energias de Portugal in 2007 for $2.15 billion. The 
company has changed its name in 2011 to EDP Renewables North America LLC. The 
company Horizon Wind Energy is a holding of several North American Projects in wind 
energy. It has developed wind farms in New York, Iowa, Pennsylvania, Washington, 
Oklahoma, Minnesota, Oregon, Texas, Indiana and Illinois, like Blue Canyon Wind 
Farm, Elkhorn Valley Wind Farm, Lone Star Wind Farm, among others parks. 
Applying our model in order to explain this investment, we conclude that the motive 
behind this operation was business strategic international positioning. Our analysis 
points that the main drivers of this investment were: 1) the strong knowledge existent in 
EDP in sector of distribution and commercialization electricity; 2) the strong knowledge 
existent in EDP in wind energy sector; 3) strong shareholders that made possible the 
investment; 4) market opportunities; and 5) defend market position. 
In 2009, the company WindPlus was created with the purpose of developing a new 
technology called WindFloat. The WindFloat is a floating structure, with a patented 
supporting offshore wind turbines. It is an innovative structure aimed at smooth the 
motions induced by waves and wind. Thus, it is possible to deploy wind turbines 
offshore where wind resources are superior in previously inaccessible locations (where 
the water exceeds 50 m depth). This is clearly a technological spin-off. Applying our 
model in order to explain its creation, we might state that it was drivenr by the 
opportunity that this technology could bring. Our analysis further points that the main 
drivers of this investment were: 1) the strong knowledge existent in EDP in wind energy 
sector; 2) strong stakeholders that make this investment; and 3) market opportunities 
worldwide.  
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In 2010, it was created EDP Renováveis Portugalholding and managing all investments, 
facilities, projects and activities in the production and sale of renewable energy in 
Portugal. Applying our model in order to explain this creation, again behind this 
operation was business and operational efficiency, following the same strategy of other 
international operations. In this way the main drivers of this creation were: 1) the strong 
knowledge existent in EDP in sector of distribution and commercialization electricity; 
2) strong stakeholders that made possible the investment; 3) hold market position; and 
4) the complementarities expected to have with the Electrical production. 
Still in 2010, it was created the EDP Mop - Operação de Pontos de Carregamento de 
Mobilidade Eléctrica with the objective of managing all activities related with the 
electrical recharge points located in the road sector (electrical cars, electrical motors), 
integrated on what was called the Portuguese electrical mobility network. The company 
aims also other service or activities that could be related with this. This network was 
design by the former government, following the strategic investments in green energy. 
With this network the Portuguese government tried to encourage the adoption of green 
vehicles, reducing in this way the energetic dependency on fuel. Applying our model in 
order to explain this investment, it is clear that behind this operation was business 
opportunity. In this way the main drivers of this creation were: 1) the strong knowledge 
existent in EDP in sector of distribution and commercialization electricity, 2) strong 
shareholders that made possible the investment, 3) hold market position and 4) the 
future market opportunity.  
The impact of corportate spin offs on company’s performance 
Analyzing the EDP Renováveis’s performance it evidencesimpressive growth rates (cf. 
Table 3). Thus, despite international and national negative conjecture there was no need 
to change the strategy. 
Table 3: Performance results of EDP Renováveis (M€) from 2007 to 2010 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
growth rate 
(%) 
Operational 
Results 
214,5 438 542,5 712,7 
Growth Rate (%)  104,2% 23,9% 31,4% 53,1% 
Source: Author based on financial reports of the company. 
 
During the period under analysis the company showed a sustainable growth, 
maintaining a high rate growth.  
 43 
Despite the international conjecture in several industrializes countries, according to 
World Wind Energy Association
4
 the emerging markets like India and China are taking 
the lead in this domain. Having this in mind, the latest acquisition of 21,4% of the 
EDP’s Corporation by the China Three Gorges Corporation, opens huge opportunities 
to EDP Renováveis as according the World Wind Energy Association the global wind 
power growth looks very strong and is on a continued rise largely because of China’s 
incredible level of investment.  
3.5. Galp Energia 
3.5.1. Brief description of the company 
The Galp Energia Corporation is one of strongest companies in Portugal and thereby 
one of the top companies in the PSI-20. The company developed several activities in the 
petroleum products and natural gas, which extend from exploration and production of 
oil and natural gas, refining and distributing petroleum products, distribution and sale of 
natural gas and electric power generation. 
After the military coup in 1974, Portugal handed over power to its overseas provinces. 
In Portugal, Petrogal was formed in April 1976 from four Portuguese companies —
SACOR, CIDLA, SONAP, and Petrosul — that were nationalized following the 
revolution of April 1974. 
Galp Energia was created on April 22, 1999 under the name of Galp - Oil and Gas de 
Portugal, SGPS, SA aiming the exploration of the business of oil and natural gas 
following the restructuring of the energy sector in Portugal.  
Galp Energia included Petrogal, the only major refiner and distributor of petroleum 
products in Portugal and Gas de Portugal, importer, carrier and distributor of natural gas 
in Portugal.  
Galp Energia's initial public offering on the Lisbon Stock Exchange took place in 2006.  
The Galp Energia today have a very strong presence in the business of distribution of 
petroleum products in Spain and in the African continent, particularly in Cape Verde, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola.  
                                                 
4
 World Wind Energy Association – from http://www.wwindea.org at 2 June of 2012. 
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From the start the company defined as strategy to growth and to be transformed into an 
integrated operator of energy present in a relevant way across the value chain of the Oil 
& Gas sector. In 2008, the company decided to change the positioning and despite the 
goal to become an integrated operator continue to be same it is decided to repositioning 
the company as multi-energy supplier. The company decided to implement an ambitious 
strategy, which aimed at developing their potential for multi-operator, creating long 
term value for its shareholders. The strategy was based in two key vectors; 1) to 
increase the competitive capacity in the markets where the company is present; and 2) 
to increase and intensify the efforts to innovate, and to increase the quality and safety. 
During this period, the company engaged in activities to increase projects which could 
enable, on the one hand, the long-term supply of oil and natural gas and, in other hand, 
to provide supply to its markets in Portugal and Spain. The company established as long 
term objective to achieve a sustained production of 150 mboepd (Thousand Barrels of 
Oil Equivalents Per Day). This objective was 10 times the volume of the production of 
2007. Toward this end, Galp Energia acquired, in 2007, stakes in 20 blocks in several 
countries, seven of which were acquired in the ninth round of bidding organized by the 
Brazilian Government. 
In this way, presently Galp Energia can be considered as an integrated operator, with 
strong presence in all value chain of the oil and gas sector, extending the operations to 
emergent markets of the renewable energies. All activities are with strong expansion at 
a global scale, being present mainly in Portugal, Spain, Brazil, Angola, Venezuela, 
Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Swaziland, Gambia and East Timor. 
3.5.2. Corporate spin offs’ decision process 
In this activity all projects have a very long period of gestation. Despite this, the 
constant search for new opportunities is an essential factor to ensure long-term growth. 
In 2007 the Galp Energia added 20 new projects of exploration to its portfolio and 
secured its presence in offshore basins with high potential in Portugal, Mozambique and 
East Timor. The smaller s ize of Galp compared with other oil companies coupled with 
an effective capacity of Galp Energia to participate in integrated international operations 
with other large players allowed the company to benefit from being a standard bearer of 
Portugal in the capture of new opportunities with strong added value for shareholders 
and control of geological and political risks. 
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Refining and distribution are main areas of business of Galp Energia and from the 
beginning that the company has invested in these areas trying to extract the most value 
possible from its assets. In this way the company has two refineries and a distribution 
network for petroleum products with a high profile in the Iberian Market. The company 
has modern refining facilities in the Iberian Peninsula, connected to an efficient logistics 
network that allows supplying Portugal from north to south and the Azores and 
Madeira. With a combined capacity of (2007) 310 thousand barrels daily, the Sines and 
Porto processed crude oil from more than 10 countries for a wide range of products 
which stand out the gasoline and middle distillates. This strong capacity provides the 
availability to control the fuel market in Portugal, as the only refineries existent in 
Portugal belong to Galp Energia. 
Also, while incumbent of the natural gas business in Portugal, Galp Energia is 
determined to manage the transition to the new regulatory framework, which will lead 
to a liberalization of the market in order to preserve the value of business in the new 
context. Galp Energia have led the process of introducing natural gas in Portugal, which 
started 10 years ago, participating in all phases of development of this sector in 
Portugal, including the construction of the infrastructure, from high to low pressure and 
helping to create the natural gas market in Portugal.  
Presently, Galp Energia holds contracts for the supply of natural gas from Algeria and 
Nigeria to reach more than 6000 million cubic meters per year, supplying the whole of 
mainland Portugal, where was sold 4.2 billion cubic meters in 2007. 
Back in 2007, the company was looking to become a multi-energy supplier, investing 
on three cogeneration plants with an installed capacity of 800 MW. However, and 
according with its annual report of 2007, the challenge was to develop a portfolio of 
competitive generation with a capacity of 1,200 MW by 2010, including cogeneration 
plants, wind farms and combined cycle plants, and continuing to seek opportunities to 
develop new projects in Portugal, particularly in hydropower generation. This plan was 
in some way aligned with the energetic policy strategic of the former government, 
which represented huge opportunities for some companies, most notably Galp Energia. 
Still in 2007, Galp Energia obtained the license to sell electricity in Portugal in the 
liberalized market, being able to formally start business, planning to enter 2008 in the 
wholesale electricity market. Additionally, Galp Energia obtained the production license 
to build a combined cycle power plant in Sines, with an installed capacity of 800 MW, 
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which according to the company was an important step in the production of electricity 
market regime. With this investment, Galp Energia planned to not only enter in market 
with high growth but also explore synergies with the area of natural gas.  
Following the launch of the National Plan for High Potential Dams (PNBEPH - Plano 
Nacional de Barragens de Elevado Potencial) (), in 2007, Galp Energia decided seeking 
to add capacity to its portfolio of hydroelectric power generation, thereby 
complementing the capacity of thermal power generation with renewable energy 
production. In this same year Ventinveste consortium, lead by Galp Energia with a 34% 
stake, won the B phase of the public tender for allocation of points for approval of wind 
that came to assign a power of 400 MW, which could reach 480 MW. The eight parks 
planned in the project should become operational by 2013. The sale of electricity from 
wind farms is subjected to special arrangements. For instance,  in cogeneration plants 
the sale is guaranteed by volume and a regulated tariff in the first 15 years of the project 
or until it reached a production of 33 GWh per MW installed.  
In 2008, Galp Energia started The Wind Project @ Sea aiming the assessment of wind 
power in the west coast of Portugal, for the identification, selection and characterization 
of sites for offshore wind farms. The initiative was developed by the consortium of 
composed by Galp Energia (the leading developer), INETI, Hydrographic Institute, and 
INEGI (National Institute of Engineering and Industrial Management ).  
The year 2009 was a turning point in the biofuel sector in Portugal and Spain with the 
entry into force of mandatory incorporation of biofuels in road fuels. In anticipation of 
this statutory requirement, Galp Energia had already begun to introduce these products 
from renewable sources in day-to-day, constituting itself as a pioneer company in 
promoting sustainability in road transport. 
In 2010, Galp Energia increased its stake from 34% to 49% in a wind project, which 
corresponds to 200 megawatts of installed capacity. Galp Energia has the expectation 
that, in 2013, the installed capacity of 200 megawatts is fully operational. In the fourth 
quarter of 2010, the company began the construction of the Grand Valley wind farm 
with an installed capacity of 12 megawatts, expected to be completed in 2011, which is 
a step forward the strategy defined to become a multi-energy supplier. 
The net entitlement production of crude oil in 2010 increased 22% compared to that of 
2009 to 11,800 barrels daily, which prove that the expansion and investments that the 
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company undertook started to give returns. Also the investment made in the refineries 
started to be translated into higher margins. In 2010, the net result of Galp Energia was 
€ 306 million, 43% higher than in 2009, which was due to improved operational 
performance of Gas & Power and Refining & Marketing business segments. 
3.5.3. The impact of corportate spin offs on company’s performance 
Analyzing the economic performance of Galp Energia, despite international and 
national negative conjecture there was no need to change the strategy.  
Table 4: Performance results of GALP Energia(M€) from 2007 to 2010 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Average 
growth rate 
(%) 
Exploration & 
Production 
233 200 168 214 
Refining & 
Distribution 
11115 13224 10620 12388 
Gas & Power 1455 1942 1425 1735 
Operational 
Results 
12557 15062 12008 13998 
Growth Rate 
(%) 
 19,9% -20,3% 16,6% 5,4% 
Source: Author based on financial reports of the company. 
 
During the period under analysis the company did not used the technological spin-off as 
a management instrument, having a conservative approach to business and to the market 
opportunities.  
Despite the intention, communicated in several annual reports, of wanting to pursue a 
strong international expansion, the fact is that all steps made were mainly towards the 
increase of its current activities, or towards the increase of the operational efficiency. 
Even the repositioning of the company as multi-energy supplier did not brought any 
change on its approach to the business.  
The behavior of Galp Energia reflects that of an incumbent trying to monetize their 
operations to the maximum, focused on the increase of operational margins, and in this 
way provide the maximum yield to its shareholders. 
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3.6. Sonae 
3.6.1. Brief description of the company 
Sonae is one of the largest companies in Portugal, being the largest private employer. 
The company operates in diverse businesses activities, from the telecommunications 
and information technology services, to real estate development, or even tourism and 
other related activities through its holdings like, Sonae Sierra, Sonaecom, or Sonae 
Distribuição.  
The company is headquartered in Maia (North Portugal), employing about 39,000 
people. The chairman and main shareholder is Belmiro de Azevedo, one of the most 
influent and respected Portuguese businessmen.  
The company was created in 1959, in Maia, in the wood business, but more particularly 
in the production of high-pressure decorative laminates. The company name was 
originally an acronym for SOciedade NAcional de Estratificados (National Company of 
Engineered Wood). This was the core business, which is now fully integrated into an 
autonomous spin-off, the Sonae Indústria.  
The company stayed focused in the wood sector market during several years, remaining 
as a small/medium company. After the military coup in 1974, the company was 
nationalized. However, it was rapidly privatized when the political stability returned. 
After this, Sonae began a process of diversification and expansion in line with the 
positive clime of growth that the country and the Europe experienced. This led Sonae to 
acquire a supermarket chain, following the launch of the first hypermarket in Portugal, 
and later the development of the shopping center business. 
The company had defined as key strategy “stay focus” in their core business. As 
outcome of this strategy, the Sonae Imobiliaria (Real Estate) became its first spin off. It 
was created having as main objective the construction of shopping centers anchored by 
Sonae stores. The company built the Cascais Shopping in 1991 and the Centro Colombo 
in 1997. These were on the first super shopping centers in the Iberian Peninsula. 
Applying our framework to analyze the main drivers of this spin-off, we can point that 
these were: 1) the strong knowledge existent in sector of real state; 2) the trend that 
exist in other countries in Europe and in USA, and in this way the market prospect; 3) 
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the need to leveraged the Sonae stores; 4) the strategy of focus; 5) hold market position, 
and 6) investment capacity. 
At the same time, Sonae invested in many different areas such as telecommunications, 
information technology, leisure and tourism. In 1994  created the holding to handle 
these areas. Sonaecom assumed its present name in 1999. Sonaecom is the sub-holding 
of the Sonae Group for the Telecommunications, Media and Software and Systems 
Information (SSI), playing an active role in the integrated management of business units 
that correspond to it, identifying and exploiting existing synergies and potential 
company's growth. 
From its beginning the company pursuit expansion through the spin-off of new 
companies, or moving to new business through joint-ventures, as the ones made with 
France's Continent (later Carrefour) for hypermarkets, France's Champion (later 
Carrefour) for supermarkets, Germany's Vobis for computer stores, France Telecom for 
telecommunications, Brazil's Emplanta.  
An example of this was the creation of the Optimus, operation that started on September 
1998, against the two longer-established operators TMN and Telecel, now a subsidiary 
of the Vodafone Group. This was made through joint-venture with France Telecom that 
enabled Sonae to acquire the necessary know-how to handle a telecommunication 
operator. 
In 1996, and following the strategy of maintain the focus on the core business, and 
facing the strong international growth, it was decided to split the holding Sonae 
Indústria in two. In this way was spun-off a new company to lead to the emerging 
businesses (including software and telecommunications). This company was called 
Inparsa SGPS, SA.  
Later on, in September of 1999, there was a major reorganization of the group. It was 
decided that the Sonae Investimentos SGPS should reacquired Inparsa SGPS, and 
simultaneously to acquired Figest. Furthermore, it was decided to simplify the formal 
name of the company, changing it from the formal name Sonae Investimentos SGPS, 
SA to the new simplified Sonae SGPS, SA.  
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3.6.2. Corporate spin offs’ decision process 
From the beginning Sonae defined that the group should maintain the focus on their 
core business, but also, should increase their operations through business 
diversification. These should be obtained through the prospect of other forms of value 
creation, intervening and supporting businesses in areas where the experience of the 
holding represents an advantage. Such a combination would lead to an increase in value 
through: 1) cooperation in developing strategies and objectives; 2) allocation of capital 
by sub-holdings and business opportunities; 3) seeking proactive and continuous 
opportunities for M&A; 4) human resources centralization of top management; 5) 
proactive management of institutional relations; and 6) leverage the brand, size and 
internal powers of Sonae. 
Sonae defined as key vector to the group growth the internationalization, stay focused 
on the company core business and in the adjacent business areas. According to Belmiro 
Azevedo (in the Sonae SGPS’s Annual Report of 2008), the strategy of the group was to 
be leveraged by the emergent countries with high growth rates and by mature markets. 
In geographic zones with strong economic growth but with retail markets still in 
development, should be given giving preference to countries with better governance 
practices and better political stability. In mature markets where the company was 
already present, the goal was to seek growth opportunities in different concepts that the 
company skills could provide a clear competitive advantage and positive value offer. It 
was the chairman’s ambition that Sonae by got by 2012 25% of its turnover and 35% of 
its assets linked to international operations. 
Sonae defined as a cornerstone the holding, which would generate the most of value 
added and growth to the group. This should be obtain through a simple and agile 
management structure at the holding company level, designed to allow each sub-holding 
have its own management team, in total dedication, focused on developing their own 
strategies, based on specific factors of the business, having in this way increased 
operational efficiency.  
The companies admitted to participate in other projects where despite not having the 
share control, could see in the partner(s) specific know-how that they did not possess or 
where the contribution of Sonae could provide superior economic value to the 
partnership. In these circumstances the company would promote consolidation 
processes and other restructuring moves, increasing the overall efficiency. For Soane, 
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the role of partners played a critical role, especially in new geographies, where the 
partners would have the ability to provide technical support and to develop the 
necessary high level professional network , vital for the business success. According 
with the annual reports of 2007 and 2008, this strategy could divert more than 10% of 
the Group’s capital employed in the business that does not have controlling stakes. 
In the beginning of 2009 Sonae announced its corporate strategic guidelines for future 
growth, stressing that the main goal was to transform the company into a major 
multinational. Sonae began positioning itself as a retail company in the shopping centre 
and telecommunication businesses. It made clear its belief that international expansion 
was its key strategic objective and also a requirement given the constraints to growth in 
Portugal. This expansion would be achieved by entering into new markets with concepts 
that were considered to have a clear advantage over the competition.  
Moreover,  innovation was considered as one of the key pillars of sustainability and 
long-term differentiation and in this way Sonae tried continuously to explore and 
examine opportunities with potential for value creation. Sonae underlined that 
innovation makes part of their culture and attitude of all employees and partners, and, in 
this way, a competitive and differentiator factor. 
Presently, Sonae is composed by several sub-holdings, grouping the hundreds of 
companies by business sector: 1) Sonae Industria; 2) SonaeCom; 3) Sonae MR (Food , 
Retail) and Sonae SR (Specialized Retail) – (called Sonae Distribuição); 4) Sonae Sierra 
and Sonae RP (Property Retail) (called Sonae Sierra);5) Sonae Investimento and 5) 
Sonae Capital. 
Figure 9 depicts some relevant events under the period of analysis which can help to 
understand the growth strategy defined. 
 
Figure 9: Sonae’s relevant chronological events: time scale 
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During the period in analysis (2007-2010), there were several important events, which 
can be explained by the position of the company. In 2007 the company was very 
aggressive, having and moved countless operations of acquisitions. We underline two 
operations: the acquisition of Carrefour Portugal, in line with the company strategy, and 
the creation of joint-ventures to gain specific-know and to increase the business 
performance. In 2007 Sonae launched a takeover bid for PT (Portugal Telecom). This 
operation, however, was not successfully concluded due to several factors, including the 
failure to unlock the status of PT. Notwithstanding, such operation spurts the emergence 
of PT Multimedia (now called ZON-Multimedia), a spin-off of PT Corporation  , 
repositioning the fixed telecommunications market. 
3.6.3. The impact of corportate spin offs on company’s performance 
Between 2007 and 2010 the company performance slow downed. This might be 
explained by the cooling of the global economy and by the difficult to access to 
financing. Nevertheless, the company continued to show positive growth rates, despite 
negative conjecture (see Table 5).  
Table 5: Performance results of Sonae SGPS (M€) from 2007 to 2010 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Average 
growth rate 
(%) 
 4417 5353 5665 5914  
Growth Rate 
(%) 
 21,2 5,8 4,4 10,5 
Source: Author based on financial reports of the company. 
 
Given the complex structure of Sonae, we considered critical to detail the most relevant 
business segments of Sonae. 
3.6.4. Sonae Indústria 
As referred, Sonae Indústria’s core business was originally the high pressure decorative 
laminates called Sociedade Nacional de Estratificados (Sonae), have being created in 
1959. Today Sonae Industria is dedicated to engineered wood, being itself a spin-off 
from Sonae SGPS. 
Applying our model to this company’s setting, we can state that the main driver of the 
spin-off was the clear intention of intensify the focus on the core business of engineered 
wood. 
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The business ‘autonomy’ of Sonae Indústria happened in 2005. This operation consisted 
of a split of part of the shareholding held by Sonae – SGPS, S.A. in Sonae Indústria – 
SGPS, S.A. and its integration in Sonae 3P – Panels, Pulp and Paper, SGPS, S.A.. 
Today it is one of the world leaders in the wood-based products sector. This position 
was achieved after the takeover of the German company Glunz AG, in 1998, followed 
by an organic growth. This helped to consolidate the company’s globalization process.  
 
In these last years Sonae Industria has maintained its focus on the production, and no 
venture operations mergers or acquisitions where undertaken. This can be explained due 
the slowdown of the global economy, which also justifies the poor performance of the 
company (cf. Table 6). 
Table 6: Performance results of Sonae Indústria (M€) from 2007 to 2010 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Average 
growth rate 
(%) 
 2066 1769 1283 1293  
Growth Rate 
(%) 
 -14,4 -27,5 0,8 -13.7 
Source: Author’s, based on financial reports of the company. 
3.6.5. Sonae Distribuição 
Sonae Distribuição was created in 1985 by the operation of merging two large retailers, 
Modelo and Continente. Modelo was owned by the Sonae, while Continente was the 
Portuguese and Spanish operation of the French retailer Promodès, known by the ensign 
Continent. In fact, Continent was in part owned by Carrefour, a French company, that 
sold their share to Sonae for €345 million on 16 November 2004. In the end of 2007, 
Sonae bought Carrefour Portugal to Promodès.   
The company evolved for two distinct areas: 1) basic food retail, including Continente 
hypermarkets (with an average sales area of approximately 8,000 m2), hypermarkets 
Modelo (with a sales area of approximately 2,000 m2), and supermarkets Modelo 
Bonjour (with a sales area of approximately 1,000 m2); and 2) non-food retail, 
including the Worten (appliances and consumer electronics open in 1995), Sport Zone 
(sporting goods), and Modalfa (ready-to-wear, open in 1997). This strategy have 
continued in order to expand company business portfolio, and also pursuing synergies 
with the Sonae Group. This lead to the development of new formats in the non-food 
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area, namely Zippy (clothing for children and babies that opened in 2004) and Worten 
Mobile (expert in the field of telecommunication equipment also opened in 2004). 
In 2007, the priorities of Sonae Distribution focused on capitalizing the previous 
initiatives trying to consolidating the leadership in the Portuguese market. The strategy 
was leveraged through the opening of new stores, and as well developing new business 
formats and investment in efficiency programs and innovation by launching initiatives 
targeted consumer loyalty end.  
In 2009, the company decided to perform reorganization, in line with other operations to 
maintain the focus on the core business. In this way, Sonay Distribuição was split in two 
companies. Sonae MC, focused on the food retail segment, and the Sonae SR, focused 
on the Specific Retail operations. 
Its market position has been achieved through a long term strategy based on: 1) a strong 
knowledge of the market, allowing them to provide reliable service and high quality to 
all customers; 2) continued investment in innovation, aiming at the differentiation; 3) 
enhancing operational efficiency through improved information systems, modernization 
of logistics and personnel training; and 4) a strong brand, with one of the highest levels 
of reputation and confidence. 
In 2009, progress was made towards the international expansion. This was obtained 
mainly by strengthen the presence in the Spanish market with the opening of 22 stores, 
totaling 22 thousand m2. At the end of 2009, the company had three different operations 
in Spain: 1) Worten, with 14 stores totaling 34 thousand m2; 2) Sport Zone (with 14 
stores totaling 17 thousand m2; and 3) Zippy (Kids clothing) with 10 stores totaling 4 
thousand m2.  
Despite the slowdown of the global economy, the Soane Retail maintained a very 
positive performance as can be seen in Table 7. 
In the retail food sector, the total income continued to growth, however with a slight 
slowdown in the years of 2009 and 2010. Again these can be explained by lack of 
consumer confidence and purchases after the international financial crisis. Sonae has 
fought against this puting forward some interesting strategies to guarantee the customer 
loyalty: 1) customer loyalty card; 2) strong investment in the brand; 3) promotions and 
discounts. 
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In the non-food retail sector, the economic performance continued to evidence strong 
growth rate, around 17%, being already 40% of income of retail. The strategy of 
leveraging the know-how in retail for different sector, through the opening of new 
companies, has been a huge success. Applying our framework to analyze the main 
drivers of these spin-offs, we can point that were: 1) the strong knowledge existent in 
sector of real state; 2) the expected synergies; 3) the need to leveraged the Sonae 
Shopping’s; 4) following a strategy of focus; 5) hold market position; and 6) strong 
investment capacity.  
Table 7: Performance results of Sonae Retail (M€) from 2007 to 2010 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 a.g.r. (%) 
Food 
 2368,4 2930 3106 3275 
11,7% 
  23,7% 6% 5,4 
Continente 
1133 1537 1568 1594 
13,1% 
 35,7% 2% 1,7% 
Modelo 
1113 1339 1458 1577 
12,5% 
 20,3% 8,9% 8,2% 
Modelo Bonjour 
116    
 
    
Bom Bocado 
5 9 18 26 
74,8% 
 80% 100% 44,4% 
Well's 
23 40 52 62 
41% 
 73,9% 30% 19,2% 
Book.it 
 1 5 9 
160% 
  400% 80% 
Non-Food 
 783 928 1132 1272 
17,6% 
  18,5% 22% 12,4% 
Worten 
460,8 563 708 813 
20,9% 
 22,2% 25,8% 14,8% 
Vobis 
64,2 53 45 30 
-21,9% 
 -17,4% -15,1% -33,3% 
Worten Mobile 
6,9 11 45 30 
111,7% 
 59,4% 309,1% -33,3% 
Modalfa 
91,2 102 115 125 
11% 
 11,8% 12,7% 8,7% 
Zippy 
16,6 28 39,3 38,5 
48,8% 
 68,7% 39,3% 38,5% 
SportZone 
143,1 170 205 228 
16,9% 
 18,8% 20,6% 11,2% 
Source: Author’s, based on financial reports of the company. 
 
It is important to point out the case of Vobis which experienced a very poor 
performance being presently in a merging process with Worten. 
3.6.6. Sonae Sierra 
The Sonae Sierra was created in 1989 with propose of helping Sonae Distribuição in the 
management of commercial galleries owned and seizing opportunities for expansion. 
Today Sonae Sierra is an international company, specialized in shopping centers, which 
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aims to become the leading operator of shopping centers and leisure, through a new and 
innovator approach, adopting an integrated business ownership, development and 
management activities (asset management and property management). 
The company’s strategy of "build and hold" encompasses an integrated vision of long-
term investment ensuring that the value of shopping centers increases over time and 
being today one of the most important pillar of sustainability and value creation. 
In late 2007, Sonae Sierra was present in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Germany, Greece, 
Romania and Brazil, owning 47 shopping centers with a total gross leasable area (GLA) 
of more than 1.85 million m2, holding a GLA under management more than 2.1 million 
m2. 
In 2009, with the reorganization of the Sonae’s Group, Sonae Sierra spun-off a new 
company, the Sonae RP (Property Retail), in order to management all properties related 
with retail. With this operation the objective was to maintain Sonae Sierra’s focus on 
the management of the Shopping Centers, and create a new company to handle 
exclusive of the real estate. 
Analyzing this operation through our model, the main drivers were: 1) follow the 
strategy of focus; 2) enhancing operational efficiency.  
In 2010, we note a remarkable growth in international operations, especially in the 
Sonae Sierra Brazil, which leverage the global operating results (Table 8). 
Table 8: Performance results of Sonae Sierra (M€) from 2007 to 2010 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 136,9 168,8 156 318 
Growth Rate (%)  23,3 -7,6 103,8 
Source: Author’s, based on financial reports of the company. 
3.6.7. Sonae Capital 
The Holding Sonae Capital was created in 2006, aggregating the company Sonae 
Turismo, SGPS, which started in 1994, and the company Spred, SGPS. These two 
companies followed the Sonae strategy of diversifying, applying the know-how in the 
retail, and real estate management, and the capacity of investment at disposal.  
In this way the Sonae Turismo started to develop tourism operations. This was 
leveraged with partnerships, which enabled the management of hotels with integrated 
service delivery (SPA, Catering and Events, congress center, food court and parking) 
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and the management of health clubs. Later, the company entered in the business of 
Resort and Residential, which comprises the development (design and construction), 
management, marketing and sale of tourist resorts and residential developments of high 
quality. The company Spred, SGPS, SA, was initially created to specialize in 
investments through the Seed or Venture Capital, enabling interesting projects, or 
creating joint venture with specialized partners, increasing the corporation know-how 
and networking, leveraging the quick affirmation and growth in those activities sectors. 
In 2010 Sonae Capital showed a decrease in operational profits, what can be explain by 
the atmosphere of distrust that has developed with the international financial crises.  
Table 9: Performance results of Sonae Capital (M€) from 2007 to 2010 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 197,3 230,5 272,2 178,6 
Growth Rate (%)  16,8 18,1 -34,4 
Source: Author based on financial reports of the company. 
3.6.8. SonaeCom 
Sonaecom was created in 1994 as a consequence of the strategy of diversification and 
expansion of Sonae, which lead to the investment in areas such telecommunications and 
information technology.  
Today Sonaecom is a sub-holding being responsible for  business segments related to 
Telecommunications, Media and Software and Systems Information (SSI), playing a 
huge role in the group, helping to exploit the existing synergies and potential company's 
growth. 
According with annual report of 2007, the company achieved a market share of 13.5% 
of the Portuguese telecommunications market in late 2007.Today Optimus continues as 
the third operator in this market, trying to gain market share through a fresh and young 
image, relying with 2.9 million subscribers and a market share of 20% in late 2007. 
Sonaecom is present also in the “fixed telecommunication” (telephony, ADSL, and 
IPTV), through the companies Novis and Clix, consolidating the position as a leading 
alternative operator in Portugal, offering voice, Internet and IPTV to their residential 
customer base. In late September 2007, Sonaecom Fixed achieved a market share of 
15.4% in the broadband market and 21% of the market for voice telephony (the players 
in this market include PT, ZON-Multimedia, Vodafone, among others). Sonaecom is 
also present in the media sector, owning the newspaper Público, a national daily 
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newspaper of reference in Portugal. It is still present in the field of Software and 
Information Systems, having the company WeDo, which it is emerging as a significant 
supplier of systems integration and consulting, specialized in telecommunications and 
the global leader in revenue assurance skills. Revenue assurance is typically associated 
to telecommunications sector, helps the companies to improve profits, revenues and 
cash flows without influencing demand. 
WeDo Technologies initiated its activity in 2001 as a provider of solutions to Business 
Assurance. Over the past eight years, the company has installed its solutions in more 
than 125 companies in 78 countries across five continents and has provided consulting 
services to over 100 operators through the successful division of Consulting, the 
Praesidium. Presently the company is located in Dublin (Ireland), Braga (Portugal), and 
Poznan (Poland). In 2007, the company acquired the Cape Technologies Limited (a 
company based in Ireland), becoming the world leader in integrated software for 
Revenue Assurance. 
The SonaeCom owns other leading companies in the Portuguese context: 1) Mainroad, a 
leader in providing information technology services and solutions for IT Managed 
Services, IT Security, Business Continuity, IT Service Management and ITIL 
Consulting; 2) Bizdirect, whose minority shareholders are BPI and AITEC, being a 
reference in the marketing of multi-brand IT solutions; 3) Saphety, a company created 
in 2006 for wireline operations, which is a supplier of electronic invoicing services 
certification and security in B2B transactions (in 2008 was integrated in the B2B 
division of Bizdirect). 
In a recent past SonaeCom had other successful spin-offs, most notably, Enabler. This 
company was created in 1997 from the autonomy of the Directorate of Information 
Systems Sonae Distribution, whose activities and experience in the design and 
development of information systems for Modelo Continente provided a solid base of 
knowledge of retail systems and processes. In June 2006, the company was acquired by 
Wipro Technologies yielding 41 Million Euros.  
Applying our framework to analyze the main drivers of these spin-offs, we can point 
that all were motivated by: 1) the knowledge existent the company, earn with time and 
the necessity; 2) the expected synergies that was expected to get with group; 3) the 
expectation of leveraged the internal know-how in financial profits for the group; 4) 
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focus strategy, giving opportunity to the company create his own path; 5) hold market 
position and 6) strong investment capacity.  
The dynamic behavior in the sector of Software and Information Systems, follows the 
group's strategy, focused on growing existing businesses, but also the awareness of new 
opportunities within the existing portfolio of businesses, or through acquisitions and 
investments in start-ups. 
In the last quarter of 2010 a new business unit, called Optimus Connect, was created. 
This unit, dedicated to the development of emerging businesses in the area of M2M 
connections between machines, embraces the concept of "Internet of Things". Through 
a small highly specialized team, this unit aims to create new solutions with value in the 
area of mobile data and broaden the range of technological and commercial partnerships 
for specific sectors of activity. This business development is supported by an 
operational platform that allows with extreme efficiency the availability of 
communication solutions, great flexibility, and reduced cost in the area of M2M. This 
business area  offers the customer an array of services and features with added value, 
which guarantees recognition and differentiation to the Optimus Connect. It is expected 
that the Optimus Connect could assert the market with greater penetration in the 
segment of transport, banking, health, energy, and water. This service was 
commercially launched in September of 2012.  
Table 10: Performance results of SonaeCom (M€) from 2007 to 2010 
  
2007 2008 2009 2010 
Average 
growth 
rate (%) 
Mobile 
         
 
 
Client
s  
2,9 
 
3,2 
 
3,4 
 
3,6 7,5 
ARPU 
 
18,2 
 
16,8  
 
14,8 
 
13,7 -9 
Optimus 
 
153,7 619,4 142,4 629,1 166,7 607 185,5 592,8 
-1.4 
   
1,6% 
 
-3,5% 
 
-2,3% 
Fixed 
9,8 255,4 14 291,4 5,7 245,2 3,5 237,6 
-1.6 
   
14,1% 
 
-15,9% 
 
-3,1% 
Media 
-3,3 33,2 -3,2 32,4 8,4 52 8,5 25 
2.1 
   
-2,4% 
 
60,5% 
 
-51,9% 
SSI 
4,6 79,5 7,1 120,1 5,1 149,9 3,4 142,5 
23,6 
   
51,1% 
 
24,8% 
 
-4,9% 
Source: Author based on financial reports of the company. 
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Despite the increase in the customer base, the operational performance had a slight 
decrease (Table 10). This can be explained by the ARPU decrease 9% per year between 
2007 and 2010. This fact can be explain by the aggressiveness existent in the mobile 
market, by the fact that the market is highly saturated with rates of penetration over 
100%, and also by the slowdown of the Portuguese economy. According to  ICP-
ANACOM at the end of 2nd quarter 2012 (2Q2012), there were approximately 16.6 
million active mobile stations 2 associated with post-paid tariff plans, pre-paid plans 
and combined/hybrid plans at the end of 2nd quarter 2012 (2Q2012), falling 0.8 per cent 
compared to the previous quarter, but increasing 1.7 percent compared to 2nd quarter 
2011). 
In the fixed, the behavior was very similar, and can be explained for the same factors. 
In the SSI, WeDo Tecnologies is the company that contributes the most, evidencing 
impressive growth rates, with the exception of the final year (2010). Currently, WeDo 
Technologies serves more than 150 customers in 80 countries. During 2011, 
international revenues represented 67.4% of its net sales, increasing 5.8% over 2010 
with the strengthening of its presence in the regions of Africa and Asia. Mainroad, 
despite the market conditions, continues to growth, having increased the operational 
business volume. Between 2010 e 2011, the increase was of 17.5%.  
On the global, and despite the economic conjecture, Sonaecom has maintained the 
operational results. 
3.7. Technology spin-off as corporate performance instruments: a qualitative and 
quantitative synthesis 
Our empirical investigation was focused on four distinct corporations belonging to 
different market segments, with different trajectories, experiences, and entrepreneurial 
cultures. The investigation aimed in the identification of the conditions that give origin 
to the spin-offs, most particularly the technological spin-offs. Table A1 (in Appendix), 
presents a ‘quantitative’ summary of the evidence gathered from the corporations in 
study, being divided in three different sections, which reproduce the proposed 
theoretical framework of analysis: 1) the inputs that create the opportunity for the 
(technological) spin off; 2) the factors that influence in the decision process; and 3) the 
economic performance that the host company has from the spin off process.  
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The four companies analyzed were responsible for the creation of 40 spin offs, being 14 
(35%) classified as technological spin offs. Galp was the only company that did not 
create spin-offs. As such, we might conclude that this company did not use the spin-off 
as a management instrument. In part, this might be explained by the fact that this 
company is an established incumbent, operating in a business sector that has a 
monopoly over several years.  
Departing from Table A1 it was possible to quantify the process of spin off creation and 
use the data for statistical and econometric analysis based on the ‘model’ described in 
Chapter 1. Thus, in this section, and in a very preliminary stance, we assess the 
determinants of host company’s performance impact derived from each of its spin offs. 
Specifically, we evaluate which of the inputs (Human capital, Organizational identity, 
Market, R&D, Network partners) and drivers (Technology potential, Market trends, 
Defended market position, Investment, Localization, Human capital, Stakeholder 
structure, Complementarities) emerge as statistically relevant for this sample of spin 
offs analyzed, controlling for the spin off characteristics (experience in business and 
sector in which it operates) and type of spin off (technological versus other). 
The descriptive statistics in Table 11 and Table A2 (in Appendix) show that only 35% 
of the spin offs analyzed can be classified as technological, and that these technological 
spin offs are mainly concentrated in the IT&Telecom (86% of the spin offs created in 
this sector are technological) and Energy (56% of the spin offs created in this sector are 
technological). In the Retail and Others (including here Construction, Wood) sectors no 
technological spin off was created. The most frequent inputs used in the process of spin 
off creation are the Market and network partners (in 72.5% and 70% of the spin offs it 
was observed the use of the market and network partners, respectively, to feed in the 
process of spin off creation). Human capital stands also as an important input for the 
majority (65%) of spin offs. The stakeholders structure (90%), complementarities 
among business segments of the host company (87.5%), and market trends (80%) are 
the three most critical decision drivers associated to the process of creation of the spin 
offs in study. Although contributing positively to the host company performance and its 
stakeholders returns, the spin offs analyzed do not impact greatly on these dimensions. 
In terms of bivariate correlations (Table 11), the only determinants that evidence a 
significant and positive correlation with performance (company and stakeholders) are 
experience in business, the input ‘market’ and the driver ‘investment’. 
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Table 11: Correlation matrix 
 
Mean Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Perform
ance 
1. Corporate ,325 -3 3 1 ,888*** -,162 ,351** ,055 -,162 -,107 ,402*** ,096 ,144 -,206 -,059 ,078 ,411*** ,153 -,101 ,187 ,237 
2. Stakeholders 
returns 
,250 -3 3   1 -,204 ,349** -,019 -,204 -,125 ,467*** ,118 ,039 -,247 -,177 ,077 ,465*** ,118 -,066 ,236 ,067 
3. Technological spin offs 
(TSO) 
,350 ,0 1 
    
1 -,382** ,538*** 1,000*** -,284* -,135 ,454*** -,206 ,947*** ,367** -,480*** -,341** ,280* ,397** -,280* ,119 
4. Experience in business 11,8 2 53       1 -,327** -,382** ,309** ,383** -,227 -,109 -,430*** -,335** ,326** ,245 ,157 -,153 ,210 -,272* 
Inputs 
5. Human capital ,650 ,0 1         1 ,538 -,348** ,018 ,245 -,252 ,568*** ,026 -,663*** ,011 ,070 ,610*** -,245 ,040 
6. Technology ,350 ,0 1           1 -,284* -,135 ,454*** -,206 ,947*** ,367** -,480*** -,341 ,280 ,397*** -,280* ,119 
7. Organizational 
identity 
,550 ,0 1             1 ,231 -,369** -,044 -,337** -,075 ,263* -,242 -,201 -,091 ,369** -,038 
8. Market ,725 ,0 1               1 ,019 -,281* -,217 -,028 ,037 ,135 -,168 -,069 ,355** -,063 
9. R&D ,100 ,0 1                 1 ,218 ,430*** ,167 -,218 ,245 ,444*** ,231 ,111 ,126 
10. Network  
partners 
,700 ,0 1                   1 -,169 ,082 ,310* ,320** ,036 -,454*** ,145 ,247 
Drivers 
11. Technology 
potential 
,375 ,0 1                     1 ,387** -,394** -,298* ,258* ,427*** -,258* ,137 
12. Market trends ,800 ,0 1                       1 ,055 -,105 -,042 -,214 ,042 ,378** 
13. Defended 
market position 
,300 ,0 1                         1 ,137 -,036 -,711*** ,218 ,082 
14. Investment ,650 ,0 1                           1 ,245 -,062 ,280* -,119 
15. Localization ,100 ,0 1                             1 ,231 ,111 -,126 
16. Human capital ,675 ,0 1                               1 -,231 -,262* 
17. Stakeholder 
structure 
,900 ,0 1                                 1 ,126 
18. 
Complementarities 
,875 ,0 1                                   1 
N= 40. 
Legend: ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% test level, respectively 
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Thus, at a first glance, none of the relevant inputs and drivers identified by the literature 
as key for host company performance derived from the creation of spin offs, namely, 
technological spin offs – e.g., human capital, R&D, networks, complementarities – 
seem to matter in our sample. 
We further observe from the estimates of the Person correlation coefficient that, on 
average, technological spin offs are positively and significantly associated with human 
capital, R&D and technology inputs. Regarding the latter the correlation coefficient is 1, 
which means that all technological spin offs (as expected) have technology as an input. 
In terms of the technological spin off decision process, the technological potential and 
human capital emerge as the key drivers. 
Given the relatively high correlation among inputs and drivers, in the estimation of the 
econometric models (Table 12) we compute estimations for host company performance 
derived from spin off creation separating inputs (Models 1-4) and drivers (Models 5-9). 
Technology input was not included in the estimations as it was perfectly correlated with 
the variable Technological Spin Offs (TSO). Similarly, due to problems of 
multicolinearity we estimate several versions of each group of models including in 
some the variable TSO but not the dummy for the sector (1 if it belongs to Energy 
sector and 0 otherwise) and the reverse. In the group of models respecting the drivers 
there was the need to estimate one additional model given the high correlation between 
the drivers ‘human capital’ and ‘defended market position’. 
The models’ goodness of fit is adequate for micro data, with the adjusted R2 varying 
between 0.21 and 0.39, which means that about 21%-39% of the variance of the 
company’s performance (derived from the spin offs process) is explained by the 
variables included in the models. 
Estimations yield interesting outcomes. First, the input ‘market’ is the one that in 
isolation impact more on host company performance.
5
 Human capital and R&D failed 
to emerge as significant determinants of host company performance. In terms of drivers, 
the most significant variables are ‘investment’ and ‘complementarities between host 
company business segments’. 
 
                                                 
5
 Estimations for the stakeholders returns provided very similar results, thus we opted for not presenting 
the outputs here. This was quite expected given the very high correlation (0.88) between company’s 
performance and stakeholders returns (see Table 11). 
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Table 12: Technological spin offs and host corporations’ economic performance (OLS regression estimation models)  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Inputs to the spin off process 
Human capital 0.145 -0.077 -0.075 0.157 
    
 
Organizational identity -0.168 0.230 0.229 -0.043 
    
 
Market 0.265 0.336** 0.335** 0.304* 
    
 
R&D 0.096 -0.139 -0.135 -0.118 
    
 
Network  partners 0.156 0.189 0.188 0.065 
    
 
Drivers to the spin off process 
Technology potential 
    
-0.179 0.003 -0.159 -0.291 -0.607 
Market trends 
    
0.068 0.013 0.094 0.089 -0.015 
Defended market 
position     
  -0.093       
Investment 
    
0.307** 0.306** 0.125 0.135 0.285* 
Localization 
    
0.1013 0.143 0.001 -0.017   
Human capital (HC) 
    
0.1966   0.173 0.173 0.099 
Stakeholder structure 
    
-0.1215 -0.141 0.185 0.200 0.033 
Complementarities 
    
0.427** 0.383* 0.297 0.296 0.396* 
 
Technological spin off 
(TSO) 
-0.123   -0.005   0.126     0.142   
Interaction TSO*Inputs(Drivers) 
TSO*Input/Driver HC       -0.357         0.586* 
TSO*Energy       0.537**         0.111 
Characteristics of the spin off 
Business experience (ln) 0.226** 0.286*** 0.285*** 0.217** 0.246** 0.251** 0.346*** 0.338*** 0.186* 
Sector (Energy=1; 
Others=0)  
  0.694*** 0.692***       0.402** 0.406**   
Constant 0,628 0.085 0.089 0.603 0.231 0.453 -0.147 -0.144 0.384 
N 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
R2 adjusted 0.209 0.386 0.366 0.274 0.241 0.209 0.344 0.325 0.354 
Note: Excluding Business Experience which represents the years each spin off is in business (in logarithm), all the remaining independent variables are dummies which assume the value 1 when the given input/driver 
is present in the spin off creation/decision process and 0 otherwise. 
Legend: ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% test level, respectively. 
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It is interesting to note that although in isolation technological spin offs do not influence 
the performance of the host company, when interacted with the sector (energy) we 
succeed in finding that technological spin offs from the energy sector do contribute 
significantly and positively to the host company performance. Moreover, in terms of 
drivers, technological spin offs that sustain its decision process on human capital related 
drivers tend, on average, to impact significantly on host company’s performance. Thus, 
human capital driver stands as a key determinant but only when associated with 
technological spin offs.  
In terms of spin offs characteristics, it is clear that business experience and sector 
matters for the impact that spin off creation process has on host company’s 
performance. Indeed, our estimation results reflect that, on average, all other factors 
remaining constant, a more experienced spin off tends to yield better performances. The 
same happens when we are considering a spin off from the energy sector. 
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Conclusions 
The goal of our investigation was to seek the determinants that impel the creation of a 
technology spin-off, and the factors behind the success/failure of technology spin-off in 
terms of value generation. 
During the current thesis, was conducted a critical review of the existent literature on 
the spin-off’s topic, with special incidence on the impact of technological discovery in 
the process and the opportunity that could come to incumbent companies. From the 
critical review, it was proposed a framework that intents to explain the spin-off’s 
process and the decision that lead to spin-off’s creation. 
Our investigation was focused on the following companies: Martifer, EDP-Energias de 
Portugal, Galp-Energia, and Sonae-SGPS. They are firms that belong to the Portuguese 
Stock Index (PSI), with distinct characteristics, and operating in different economic 
sectors.  
The data was mainly drawn from the Annual Reports of the selected companies. 
Through a content analysis of the strategies adopted by these firms we were able to 
perform an in depth qualitative and a preliminary quantitative analysis of the host 
company’s economic performance.  
From the analyses performed it was clear that behind the spin-off’s creation, whether it 
be technological or not, stands the consideration by top management of the spin-off as 
management instrument at their disposal. But more important, is the top management’s 
belief that this instrument can unleash the economical value, in a business opportunity, 
and in this way increase the economic value of the organization. 
From the descriptive analysis, we concluded that the key inputs associated to 
technological spin-offs are: Human Capital; Technology; and R&D. Technology 
opportunity in particularly emerged, as expected, as a mandatory factor. These findings 
are aligned with the scientific literature presented in the Chapter 1. Authors like Zahra 
and George (2002) or Agarwall et al (2004), suggested that employees with superior 
knowledge capabilities are more likely to potentiate technology. This evidence is 
enlightened by the positive (and significant) correlation between the human capital 
input variable and the capacity of discover or mastering technology through the input 
technology variable. 
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Furthermore, the existence of positive influence of the R&D in the technological spin-
off’s, is also in line with literature. Authors like Zahra (1996) or Rohrbeck et al. (2009), 
had identified that R&D could transfer to the company know-how, and outcomes in the 
form of product evolutions or new technology breakthrough.  
It is also possible to affirm, that the decisions drivers that most significantly foster a 
technological spin-off’s are: Technology Potential; Defend Market position; Human 
Capital; and Market Trend. These findings are also aligned with the scientific literature. 
Authors like Clarysse et al (2005), Zahra (1996) Chesbrough (2003), Agarwall et 
al.(2004) or Narayanan et al.(2009), argue that the technology spin-off opportunity 
appears at the front of the a technology potential, that have high degree of commercial 
potential, but do not belong to the main core business. Moreover, it was possible to 
identify a strong positive correlation between the input variable R&D and the driver 
technology potential. These facts are once more aligned with the scientific literature. 
Authors like Zahra (1996), Arora et al.(2001) or Agarwall et al. (2004), suggested that 
R&D could unlock new business opportunities. This dimension is so critical that 
according with the authors companies tend to invest in monitoring technological 
developments trying to identify possible threats and opportunities. 
Nevertheless, no statistical evidence exists that could suggest that a technological spin-
off has a superior economic benefit to the host company by comparison to a 
‘standard/norma’ spin-off. Both the economic performance and shareholder returns fail 
to be significantly correlated with technological spin off type. 
Economic performance is, in contrast, directly related with the market business 
segment, revealing that a business spin-off is leveraged essentially by the market input. 
It was also observed a strong correlation between the economic performance and the 
Investment. For other hand, the investment have a negative relationship with the 
technological spin-off’s, what can lead to the conclusion that a business spin-off’s 
success have a strong dependency on the investment made. These dynamic was already 
been identify with Zahra et al. (1999), who argued that markets with high degree of 
rivalry decrease in long run the R&D expenses, diminishing the technology spin-off. 
Sector matters in the process of creation of (technological) spin offs. In our sample, 
only the sectors ‘Energy’ and ‘IT-Telecommunications’ created technology spin-offs. In 
contrast, Retail’ and the sector ‘Other’ do not showed any spin-off creation. These 
different dynamics lead to the conclusion that technology has strong relationship with 
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sector activity. ‘IT and Telecommunications’ showed a strong dynamic in technological 
spin off generation, being the technology spin-off’s percentage of total spin offs 
creations of 86%. In the sector of ‘Energy’ the percentage is lower, but even so of 57%. 
The strong dynamics existent in these sectors can be explain by the fact that are sectors 
where for being competitive one must possess strong know-how capabilities. 
The causality analysis shows that (high levels of) business experience and sector of 
activity matter for the impact of spin offs on host company performance. Moreover, 
although technological spin off per se do not determine high host company 
performance, these latter type of spin offs do impact on host company performance 
when sustained in a human capital driver. Finally, the existence of complementarities 
among host company business segments and the investment driver stand as critical 
explanatory factors for the impact of spin offs on host company performance. 
 
The Spin-off is certainly an instrument for generating economic value, available to top 
management, and as such should be used throughout in all splendor since allowed the 
company to growth and to diversity. This instrument has the advantage to maintain the 
company’s focus on their core business. In the fact we can consider the spin-off as 
strategic management instrument, allowing expansion and growth, reducing exposure to 
crises in a particular business segment or market. The Spin-off can be consider as an 
instrument of renewal, where with the right condiments is the key to open doors to new 
value propositions, through new innovative products. 
Although the present study has its merit of analyzing a rather unexplored and complex 
issue where the access to relevant data is paved with difficulties, a quantitative analysis 
based on international financial databases like the Capital IQ or Wharton Research Data 
Services (WRDS), could enrich and complement the analysis present here providing in 
this way an enlarged data set with relevant international financial information which 
could bring additional value and further clarifications on the theme. 
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Appendix 2: Corporate spin-offs analyses 
Table A 1: Corporate spin offs, inputs, main drivers and outcomes: a synthesis 
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Year 
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(Business 
segment) 
Geographi
cal 
location 
Tech
nolo
gical 
Spin off inputs Drivers - Decision Process Performance 
  
Human 
Capital 
Tech
nolog
y 
Organizati
onal 
identity 
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ket 
R&D 
Network 
partners 
Technology 
potential 
Market 
trends 
Defended 
market 
position 
Invest
ment 
Localiza
tion 
Human 
capital 
Stakeho
lder 
structur
e 
Complement
arities 
Stakehol
ders 
returns 
Economic 
performanc
e 
M
a
r
ti
fe
r 
Martifer Aluminios 2002 Constructi
on 
Portugal/N
orth 
No    
 
     
 
 
  
 + - 
Martifer Energy 
Systems 
2004 Energy Portugal/N
orth 
No 
 
          
 
 
 
- - 
REPower Portugal 2007 Energy Portugal/N
orth 
Yes 
  
 
 
  
  
   
 
 
 
+ + 
PowerBlade 2006 Energy Portugal/N
orth 
Yes 
  
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
- - 
Martifer 
Renewables 
2005 Energy Portugal/N
orth 
Yes 
  
 
     
 
 
 
   
+ + 
Martifer Solar 2006 Energy Portugal/N
orth 
Yes 
  
 
     
 
 
 
   
+ + 
HomeEnergy 2008 Energy Portugal/N
orth 
Yes 
  
   
   
   
 
  -- - 
E
D
P
 -
 E
n
e
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ia
s 
d
e
 P
o
r
tu
g
a
l 
EDP – Gestão e 
Produção de 
Energia 
1994 Energy Portugal/Ce
nter 
No 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
+++ +++ 
Naturgas 2003 Energy Spain No 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
+ ++ 
EDP – Serviços 
Universais 
2006 Energy Portugal/Ce
nter 
No 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
   
+ + 
EDP Gás Serviço 
Universal 
2008 Energy Portugal/Ce
nter 
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+ + 
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(…) 
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Spin off inputs Drivers - Decision Process Performance 
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e 
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 Sonae 
Capital 
                    
Sonae Turismo  Tourism
o 
Portugal/
North 
No 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
+ + 
Spred  Investme
nts 
Portugal/
North 
No 
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
  
 + - 
SonaeCom                     
Optimus 1998 Telecom
unictions 
Portugal/
North 
No 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
   
+ ++ 
Publico 1990 Media Portugal/
Center 
No 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
  
 - - 
bizdirect 2001 IT Portugal/
North 
Yes 
    
  
  
   
   
- - 
mainroad 2003 IT Portugal/
North 
Yes 
    
  
  
   
   
- - 
Wedo 2001 IT Portugal/
North 
Yes 
    
  
  
   
   
+ + 
saphety 2006 IT Portugal/
North 
Yes 
    
  
  
   
   
- - 
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North 
Yes 
    
  
  
   
   
+ + 
Legend:  
 Verified;  
Performance:  very weak;  weak;  slightly weak;  slightly strong;  strong;   very strong 
 
Source: Author based on financial reports of the company. 
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Table A 2: Some descriptive statistics on corporate spin offs’ types and economic performance, by 
sector 
 
sector_g TSO 
Economic 
performance 
P_Stakeholders 
returns 
Energy 
Mean ,57 ,64 ,43 
N 14 14 14 
Std. Deviation ,514 1,598 1,604 
IT&Telecom 
Mean ,86 -,29 -,43 
N 7 7 7 
Std. Deviation ,378 1,704 1,512 
Retail 
Mean ,00 ,50 ,29 
N 14 14 14 
Std. Deviation ,000 1,401 1,383 
Other 
Mean ,00 -,20 ,60 
N 5 5 5 
Std. Deviation ,000 1,095 ,894 
Total 
Mean ,35 ,33 ,25 
N 40 40 40 
Std. Deviation ,483 1,492 1,428 
Source: Author based on financial reports of the company 
 
